CONTEMPLATION ON BERG ARGUMENT IN DE RE

Автор(и)

  • Morteza Mezginejad

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.32461/2226-3209.1.2018.177670

Анотація

Abstract. Burge has provided a description of two concepts of de re and de dicto. He proves that beliefs "de re" are so fundamental that without them the understanding of language and thought would not be possible. Explaining the mathematical propositions is one of the difficulties of his theory. Understanding some mathematical de dicto beliefs are such that the de re propositions are based on them. In order to get rid of this difficulty, by extending the epistemic meaning of de re, he categorizes the purely mathematical beliefs under referential ones in spite of the fact that it seems not to be so. In a critique of Burge’s analysis, Azzouni believes that one can adhere to all premises of Burge argument but deny the main condition of de re beliefs, namely having references without committing any contradiction. In this article, we have tried firstly to answer Azzouni’s criticism then we have analyzed Burge’s working procedure. Toward the end, this article has demonstrated that, Burge's perspective about comprehension of arithmetic propositions is not exact.
Keywords: de re, de dicto, Burge, Azzouni, language.

Посилання

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Quine,W.(1960).Word and Object. USA: MIT Press.

Azzouni,J.(2009). Empty de re Attitudes About Numbers†. Philosophia Mathematica, 17(2), pp.163-188.

Dummett, M. (1975). The philosophical basis of intuitionistic logic. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, 80, pp.5-40.

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