Studia politologica Ucraino-Polona https://journals.uran.ua/spup <p>Щорічний журнал з політичних наук «Studia Politologica Ucraino-Polona» - це міжнародне наукове видання, в якому друкуються статті польських і українських науковців з політології та наближених до неї суспільно орієнтованих наук.</p><p>Співзасновники журналу</p><div style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://idpnan.org.ua/"><img src="/public/journals/404/NAN.jpg" alt="" /><a href="http://pau.krakow.pl/index.php/pl/"><img src="/public/journals/404/PolskaAkademia.jpg" alt="" /></a><img src="/public/journals/404/PolskeZhytomyr.png" alt="" /></div><p>Журнал індексується в міжнародних базах.</p><div style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.cejsh-7337cbbf-007a-4b86-bc3b-5c171754b204"><img src="/public/journals/404/cejsh.png" alt=""></a><a href="https://journals.indexcopernicus.com/search/details?id=22578"><img src="/public/journals/404/index_cop.jpg" alt=""></a><a href="https://pbn.nauka.gov.pl/polindex-webapp/browse/journal/journal-b6df20da-b50c-4817-a360-c9cc68eaee8c"><img src="/public/journals/404/polindex.png" alt=""></a><a href="https://pbn.nauka.gov.pl/sedno-webapp/journals/50239"><img src="/public/journals/404/pbn.png" alt=""></a></div><p>Журнал з 4 випуску має міжнародний індекс ISSN 2312-8933 і тому має статус закордонного наукового видання.</p> uk-UA Studia politologica Ucraino-Polona 2312-8933 <p>Автор, який подає матеріали до друку, зберігає за собою всі авторські права та надає відповідному виданню право першої публікації, дозволяючи розповсюджувати даний матеріал із зазначенням авторства та джерела первинної публікації, а також погоджується на розміщення її електронної версії на сайті Національної бібліотеки ім. В.І. Вернадського, в міжнародних базах даних CEJSH, Index Copernicus, POL-index, Polska Bibliografia Naukowa.</p> Зовнішні дилеми політичної ідентифікації українців https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/164032 <p>The author of the article notes that modern Ukraine is in a state of systemic transformation, the essence of which is to choose between conservative and modernization projects of the formation of Ukrainian statehood. This choice is compounded by the state of the socio-political crisis, military aggression and the weakness of its own geopolitical strategy. The leading factor in overcoming the modern challenges and the formation of a sovereign democratic state is the identification of citizens in public life, their consolidation around a common system of values.</p><p>The processes of consolidation of Ukrainian society are clearly reflected in the dynamics of geopolitical priorities, as they serve as a unique marker of the citizens’ position in all the most important issues of political development. Together with their cultural and civilization choice, Ukrainians choose between democracy and authoritarianism, legal protection and corruption, equal cooperation in the international arena and the status of «younger brother». It is Ukraine’s role in the geopolitical environment that is crucial for its foreign policy aimed at forming strategic partnerships and effective protection of sovereignty in the international arena. At the same time, the main function of foreign policy is to compensate for internal problems and create favorable conditions for the realization and protection of national interests.</p><p>The study of empirical indexes on the geopolitical orientation of Ukrainians made it possible to determine the main tendencies and peculiarities of the processes of foreign policy identification in modern Ukraine. It is noted that there is a rather active formation of a civil consensus around the Euro-Atlantic civilization’s choice. This is evidenced by an increase in the support of this choice in the national dimension and a marked convergence of regional positions on this issue. The conclusion is drawn about the formation of a stable tendency to strengthen the European integration orientations of Ukrainians. The continuation of military, political and cultural-information aggression of Russia makes the greatest influence on this tendency. The main motives of the European choice of Ukrainians are the desire for material well-being, legal protection and adherence to democratic values.</p><p>In most cases, rapprochement with NATO is justified by the aspirations of the country’s security, reliable protection against aggressive actions, first of all, of Russia. In addition, the objective is to modernize the army in accordance with international standards and to increase the international prestige of Ukraine. The idea of Eurasian integration is noticeably losing its popularity, especially in the regions directly confronted with the military aggression of Russia (East and West). The idea of a kind of neutrality, that is, non-alignment with any unions, preserves the considerable support, mainly due to the passage of votes from the camp of opponents of rapprochement with the EU and NATO.</p><p>The identified trends in the dynamics of the geopolitical priorities of Ukrainians are largely due to external factors and are still hardly supported by the domestic reforms of the country, as negative things such as corruption, low level of trust in power, slow pace of modernization of socio-economic sphere and low welfare of citizens persist. Under such conditions, the Ukrainian political elite should focus on the creation and implementation of effective strategies for integration and identification of citizens at the expense of real modernization of the economy and raising the standard of living.</p> Олена Новакова Авторське право (c) 2018 Олена Новакова https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 95 102 Державна політика України: між цивілізаційними і національними викликами https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/164035 <p>The key aspects of the state policy of Ukraine are considered in the context of the development of the civilizational challenges of the present day and the requirements of ensuring national safety. Separate attention applies on determination of role of national political class in realization of public policy in area of modernisation transformations. After all, the readiness of the national political class to implement the reform program of the systemic transformation of the state and society is one of the determining factors of the success of the state policy. The author argues that the emergence of a consolidated political class, which clearly recognizes national priorities and is able to defend and defend national interests, is an urgent need for the present and future for Ukraine.</p><p>In the context of the coverage of the studied issues, the peculiarities of the institutional design of the Ukrainian state and its influence on state policy were determined. It is stressed that despite the tangible democratic progress of recent decades, the threat of an increase in autocratic and authoritarian tendencies in state policy, on the one hand, and the weakening of those already shaky germs of forms of direct democracy (for example, participation democracy, self-governing forms of organization citizens), without the development of which it makes no sense to speak about the modernization potential of the state policy of modern Ukraine. For example, the real political state of the basic state and social institutions, the domination of informal rules of the game on the political field, allows us to characterize the state of the political system of Ukraine today and its separate political institutions as hybrid. One of the examples of successful implementation of the state policy of modernization of the Ukrainian state can be considered a gradual transition to the e-governance system.</p><p>E-Governance refers to innovative state policy and government technologies that are designed to ensure the effective implementation of the three functions of public policy - information, communication and participation. Therefore, the active introduction of e-governance is not just time requirements; it is the approximation of state policy to modern standards of democratic, modernized state-political control. However, it should be noted that the proliferation of e-governance entails tangible threats to the national state and national security. Let’s say the threat of violation of sovereignty. In a geopolitical situation in which Ukraine emerged after 2014, such a threat is not only virtual, but quite tangible, which puts forward special requirements to the system of state policy both at the personalized and institutionalized levels of functioning. Under such conditions, one of the main tasks of state policy is to create a reliable system of cybernetic protection of state sovereignty and national security of the country, which would maximally protect the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian citizens on the institutional and personal levels, respectively. On the other hand, an e-governance system that would be able to organically integrate into the system of global e-communication should be developed, pushing the Ukrainian state into a group of countries - pioneers of the total internetisation of the state and society. Further research on this issue should be concentrated, among other things, as the author believes, in the development of models for reviewing the principles of state policy in Ukraine in the context of the deployment of the integration of the national state into a globalized world political process.</p> Михайло Газізов Авторське право (c) 2018 Михайло Газізов https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 103 107 Довіра до суспільно-політичних інститутів в Україні і наслідки її дефіциту для країни https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/164041 <p>As usual during reforms, first of all the reformers are trying to develop a reform strategy and to find the right financial and human resources. However, the social support for reforms and public confidence in reforms and reformers are equally important resources in carrying out reforms. Therefore, public trust is an equally important resource for reform, such as finance or staffing. Instead a lack of public confidence in reform processes can be an invisible barrier, an indicator of their effectiveness or inefficiency. Public trust is not an abstract concept. Public trust is a condition for the integration of society around a number of socially significant problems, the successful reformation of the country.</p><p>The article analyzes public trust in Ukraine and outlines the consequences of its shortage in the processes of reforming society. For this purpose, the theoretical foundations of the phenomenon of public trust were defined, the notion of «institutionalized trust», «political alienation», «externalization of trust», «social capital» were distinguished; analyzed the state of institutionalized trust in Ukraine; the consequences of a deficit of institutionalized trust for the reform processes in Ukrainian society are analyzed. Such research makes it possible to understand the problems of the development of social capital in Ukraine and, in the light of this knowledge, to adjust the development of social development strategies, that is, the actual processes of reformation.</p><p>Summing up, the author stated a significant deficit of institutional trust in Ukrainian society. It concerns both the basic organs of state power and the instruments of democracy. The deficit of institutionalized trust in Ukraine is converted into three phenomena: 1) political exclusion (citizens try to distance themselves from the state as much as possible); 2) in the radicalization of society; 3) externalization of trust (hence the popular opinion in the society about the expediency of «external management», faith in the «collective action», in the «collective Saakashvili»). Also, a lack of trust in society exacerbates radical sentiment and radical actions in society.</p><p>It should be understood that Ukrainian society after EuroMaydan and Ukrainian society during the presidency of L. Kuchma, are qualitatively different societies. This confirms the dynamics of institutionalized trust. That is, EuroMaydan 2014 and Russian military aggression became a kind of «moment of great upheaval», which confirmed the demand for the revitalization of democratic institutions and elementary social justice. This means that in the near future one should expect the growth of civic activity and a surge in the demand for a radical change in the rules of the game - political institutions. Therefore for Ukraine is very important to maintain a balance between intensive political and public participation, but necessarily in a conventional way, and with an adequate response from public authorities to social inquiries.</p> Галина Зеленько Авторське право (c) 2018 Галина Зеленько https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 108 118 Внутрішньополітична безпека України крізь призму концептуалізації гібридних викликів та загроз (2014-2018 рр.) https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/164044 <p>The combination of military and non-military means of power struggle in interstate relations faced in recent years by countries such as Georgia, Moldova, Syria, Ukraine, Montenegro and others can not be considered entirely new phenomenon in world history, but with the development of information technology and the globalization of the financial and economic system has brought new opportunities for the use of economic, informational, political and military means of pressure.</p><p>Positively evaluating the achievements of Ukrainian researchers in disclosing the institutional and procedural principles of the state system functioning and political provision of national security of Ukraine, it should be pointed out that the problem of conceptualization and response to internal political risks for its national security remains unresolved in the context of the continuation of wide-ranging implementation by Russia of theoretical and methodological and applied aspects. Hybrid war combined forces and means, including in the political sphere of Ukrainian society. Some aspects of this problem were presented by the author in Polish scientific publications.</p><p>The work hypothesis found that the degree and nature of the destructive influence of individual events, phenomena and processes in the domestic political sphere, the economy, the social sphere, information activities, the fight against organized crime and corruption in Ukraine are not only conditioned by the corresponding undisguised intervention of the aggressor country, but also have an intra-Ukrainian nature, caused by the implementation of the latent interests of prominent representatives of the post-war political ruling class in Ukraine (Petro Poroshenko Bloc / People’s Front A. Yatsenyuk, A. Avakov and O. Turchinov / «Vinnytsia» group of Prime Minister of Ukraine V. Groysman).</p><p>The main components of Ukraine’s internal security at the present stage in confronting the hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation are considered: the system of ensuring political security and its subjects, internal political and interconfessional stability, public accord, civil society and political power, political regime and political security, state security, political elites and leaders, political movements, state-church relations, religious organizations, constitutional order, territorial integrity of Ukraine.</p><p>It is necessary to take into account the fact that the special organs and advocacy machine of the aggressor country in the process of information war against Ukraine attaches the highest priority to the demoralization and disintegration of Ukrainian society and discretisation of the security and defense sector. Russian propaganda for destabilizing the situation in Ukraine is actively used by the growth of negative attitudes among Ukrainian citizens.</p><p>An important problem that has emerged since the onset of hybrid aggression against Ukraine is the activity of Russian agents of influence in the parliament, political parties, local authorities and civic organizations.</p><p>The simulated nature of the overwhelming majority of institutional and procedural components of the reform of the social life of the Ukrainian state while simultaneously marginalizing social protest actions in the short term create the illusion of social stability of the new / old dominant political and business groups as a collective embodiment of kleptocracy, clientism and corruption. hybrid political regime in post-war Ukraine.</p><p>The ruling from 2014, based on client-patronage ties and faith through informal political practices, the consolidated power groups of the Bloc of Petro Poroshenko and the People’s Front are not able to overcome the crisis of confidence in power as an integral institutional and procedural system. They explain the growing internal protest potential of the Kremlin’s influence.</p><p>The potential of the ruling political class of Ukraine is also aggravated by the fact that in its hands the most powerful material resources, administrative and technical-organizational means, funds, sources and means of information transmission, ideological and legal mechanisms, etc., are concentrated. The specifics of the ruling political class of Ukraine are manifested in the implementation of strategies for self-enrichment, which obviously leads to neglect of public interests and uncontrolled and permissiveness.</p><p>Taking into account the growing scope of domestic political risk potential of national security in the projection of the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019, a process of political consolidation of the most active part of Ukrainian citizens around common values and interests, overcoming of existing political contradictions and achieving socially acceptable standards of living may be worthy of scientific analysis, consequently, ensuring the security of the individual, society and the state, preserving its independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty and file progressive development of Ukraine.</p> Василь Гулай Авторське право (c) 2018 Василь Гулай https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 119 126 Чинники та особливості політичної адаптації внутрішньо переміщених осіб в Україні https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/164050 <p>The article analyses the problems of political adaptation of Ukrainians. Military conflict in the East of Ukraine, annexation of the Crimea, socioeconomic crisis, distrust to power institutions have all caused a number of issues associated with the internally displaced people. Political adaptive relations in the society are viewed as processes of identification in which a person identifies him\herself with certain aims and political values.</p><p>The main problem, which internally displaced people face, include access to social services, having a constant place of residence and registering at the new place of residence. Such citizens receive help through oblast administrations and NGOs. As practice shows, the actions of the authorities regarding the problems of internally displaced people are mostly of a declarative nature. However, in addition to social and psychological, political adaptation is also important as it facilitates the integration of a society and its development.</p><p>Factors that influence the political adaptation of internally displaced people in the modern Ukrainian society have been identified. 1. The set system of relations between a person and the state is ruined due to state institution crisis and power decentralization. 2. The possibilities for political activity of individuals as well as social groups in the course of exercising their rights and satisfying their interests are widened. 3. Activation of non-governmental institutions facilitates the organized citizen participation in the political process, which facilitates the popularization of an active public opinion. 4. Peculiarities of the work of political actors, their reputation, level of responsibility and efficiency. 5. Social environment of a person, level of his/her education and political culture. 6. Mass media, which popularize certain patterns of political behavior, manipulate consciousness, impose stereotypes etc.</p><p>The author notes that internally displaced people are limited in their rights and freedoms in comparison with the rest of the population (deprivation of the right to vote, discriminative control of their place of residence, limitations as to the choice of a banking institution for receiving pensions and social support etc.). internally displaced people actually have no right to participate in solving local issues, despite the fact that this right is guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine. By this we mean participation in public hearings, local initiatives, general assembly of the community. In addition, internally displaced people cannot participate in establishment of bodies of population self-organization, which is one of the important forms of participation of territorial community members in solving local issues.</p><p>There is an ambiguous attitude towards the IDPs from the East of Ukraine – compassion mixed with apprehension. On the one hand, local authorities wish to provide maximum possible help for the internally displaced people. At the same time, there is a growing tension in the relations due to the increasing number of citizens who died in the zone of the conflict.</p><p>One of the key problems that hinders the adaptation of IDPs is the absence of a common national program concerning the internally displaces people as well as of a body that would be directly responsible for dealing with the issues of IDPs. Consequently, displaced people cannot trust state institutions, may perceive the political system as an enemy that does not facilitate their socialization.</p><p>The process of political adaptation of internally displaced people to the change of political space has certain peculiar features. 1. Social disorientation is caused by the deformation of the socioeconomic system of a society and is a consequence of destruction of social links, statuses and roles, the system of political norms, behavioral ideals. 2. New social identification happens through establishment of new social identities and entering the institutional structure of a society. 3. Collective political participation is carried out through citizen associations, influence on making important political decisions is made at the level of non-governmental institutions. 4. Tolerance to value foundations of a democratic society is being established.</p> Світлана Денисюк Валерій Корнієнко Авторське право (c) 2018 Світлана Денисюк, Валерій Корнієнко https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 127 131 Медійний простір України: посткомуністичний досвід https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/164210 <p>Based on a review of the extensive related literature, the changes that have taken place in the media and information space of Ukraine since Soviet times for the first twenty years of independence of that state have been shown in this article. The authors of the publication try to show the multiple conditions affecting the shaping of these spaces: from historical, social, political and economic to technological. They also indicate global phenomena that also influence the processes that shape contemporary periodic media and mediated communication of Ukraine.</p> Viktoriya Havrylyuk Marek Jachimowski Авторське право (c) 2018 Viktoriya Havrylyuk, Marek Jachimowski https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 132 144 Вплив місцевих виборів 2010 та 2015 років на конфігурацію партійної структури Закарпатської області https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/164211 <p>The paper under consideration describes the local elections of 2006-2015 in the Transcarpathian region. Their influence on the development of party structure of the region has been revealed as well.</p><p>It has been noted that according to the results of local elections of 2006 and 2010, parliamentary mandates were received by the electoral block «Our Ukraine», Yulia Tymoshenko’s block, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, the Party of Regions, Lytvyn’s People block, “KMKS”, the Party of Hungarians of Ukraine, the Democratic Party of Hungarians of Ukraine.</p><p>The distribution of party political forces on the eve of local elections and the favorites of the election campaign of 2015 are as follows: political party «Petro Poroshenko’s Solidarity Block», political party «People’s Front», political party «Unified Center». It has been stressed that the local elections of 2006, 2010, 2015 demonstrated a high result of the Hungarian parties.</p><p>The regional peculiarities of the organization of election campaigns have been clarified. The factors, determining them have been outlined as well. Among them: geographic location of the region, historical traditions, ethnic factor (the residence of the Hungarian minority) etc.</p><p>The main milestones in the evolution of the Party’s structure of the region are described: 1) 1990-1995; 1995-2002; 2002-2006; 2006-2010; 2010-2014; starting from 2014. It has been summarized that according to the results of 2014 parliamentary elections, and the local elections of 2015, the following political parties become dominant in the party’s structure: a) formed as the сonsequences of the Revolution of Dignity («Petro Poroshenko’s Solidarity Block», political party «People’s Front», political party «Samopomich” Union»); b) «regional parties» (political party “Unified Center”, KMKS, the Hungarian Party of Ukraine, the Democratic Party of Hungarians of Ukraine); c) the parties that won the results of the local elections of 2015 (political party «Vidrodzhennya», the political party «Our region», the Agrarian Party of Ukraine).</p> Юрій Остапець Авторське право (c) 2018 Юрій Остапець https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2019-04-15 2019-04-15 8 145 157 Децентралізація як виклик для партійної системи України https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/164212 <p>There is no empirical evidence of the negative impact of decentralization on the characteristics of the party system, especially when it comes to the process of party system nationalization in young democracies. In new democracies with non-uniform functional cleavages a high level of decentralization may prevent the formation of a nationalized party system. Political decentralization creates opportunities for the formation of a special, subnational party system that determines selective competition in a particular region. At the same time, financial decentralization expands access to resources (financial, land, etc.) for subnational political actors, which in turn strengthens their positions and makes them independent from the center (administrative, political, financial).</p><p>However, it is obvious that political decentralization affects the degree of party system nationalization which manifests itself in the phenomenon of regional or ethnoregional parties. Thus, the emergence of ethnoregional parties in Europe is directly or indirectly connected with decentralization processes.</p><p>In Ukraine, even before the beginning of the active phase of decentralization, local elections in October 2015 recorded the territorial fragmentation of the party system of Ukraine, for which there are no legislative prerequisites.</p><p>Parties that have managed to become members of regional councils can be classified into five types:</p><p>1) parties of the leader’s type, whose leaders were once elected in a majority district;</p><p>2) post-Maidan parties, wchich are the result of the revitalization of civil society;</p><p>3) pro-government parties, in the lists of which local officials are widely represented;</p><p>4) lobbying, defending the interests of large businesses at the local level, because the deeper is decentralization, the more powers will be transferred to local authority;</p><p>5) genuine ethnic parties, represented only by “KMKS”; the Party of Hungarians of Ukraine.</p><p>Even more alarming trends for the party system nationalization were revealed by the recent elections held in the united territorial communities (UTC), formed during the implementation of the territorial reform.</p><p>The election results in the UTG not only do not reflect, and in some moments even contradict the party structure in parliament, and the results of opinion polls on parliamentary elections.At first glance, the results of the elections in the UTC can be ignored, since they are not representative for the whole country – they cover only about 5% of all voters in Ukraine. In addition, they are held by proportional, and not mixed, as a parliamentary election, system, which can also affect the obtained results. However, together with the results of the 2015 local elections they indicate a tendency towards the denationalization of the party system: the emergence of regional political parties not represented in the national parliament, which can consciously be limited to the local level of politics. The reason is that the deepening of financial and land decentralization will provide them with the necessary resources, at least in the near future.</p> Олена Стойко Авторське право (c) 2018 Олена Стойко https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 158 163 Середній клас як гарант політичної стабільності сучасного українського суспільства https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/164213 <p>The article concerns the middle class in Ukraine, which is a determining factor of the political stability in any democratic society. The middle class is a complex social formation that has a political dimension and determines the level of citizen social and political activity, which is determined by their status of the working owner, which denies populism, political indifference and political exclusion. The criteria for belonging to the middle class are not only the high level of material security, but also the way of life, independence and the labor nature of income sources - a certain standard of living.</p><p>Due to the lack of opportunities to realize their economical potential in their own country, millions of ukrainian citizens have left to work in other countries, where the process of the modern ukrainian middle class formation is taking place. In the ukrainian society due to the availability of the lowest social standards in Europe by income, to the middle class, not so much representatives of mental labor belong, but as so-called «servicemen of the oligarchs». Deepening in the income inequality is largely the result of the development of not so much market, European mechanisms, as many pseudo-market, that make the formation of the middle class impossible.</p><p>Further functioning of the Ukrainian society political system in the format of its commitment to the interests of not the middle class, but a handful of oligarchs, only preserves the neo-feudal division of society into an absolute majority of the poor - hereditarily poor, and an unaccountably rich minority.</p><p>It is therefore logical that the political system should deviate from the paradigm of state use, its organs and finance to enrich the ruling class. A serious problem arose before ukrainian politologists and sociologists - the problem of studying the conditions of the middle class formation, which should include the presence of a clear and understandable for everyone normative base, which determines the process of the middle class formation. This, in turn, provides for the deprivation of the petty care from the state, which makes impossible the neo-feudal principle: friends must have everything, and enemies deserve the law. It is clear that the institutions of the political system must establish equality of everyone before the law, which is an important way of the middle class formation in modern Ukrainian society.</p><p>Until political institutions remain channels for collecting corrupt rents from the Ukrainian population, which is considered as a natural resource from which you can rent for owning it, it is impossible to talk about the effectiveness of reforms and the success of the middle class formation.</p><p>The leading way not only of quantitative growth but also of widespread strengthening of the economic, social, political, and spiritual positions of the middle class is a significant limitation of the political power of the clan-oligarchic groups, the reliable basis of which is the shadow economy, which concentrates millions of able-bodied Ukrainians and is an essential brake on the establishment of European civilized market relations and civic structures based on labor private property. An important way of a middle class formation and development in a transformational ukrainian society is the creation (with the state’s sake) a large number of enterprises, firms, producing material and spiritual values, whose employees demonstrate high motivation to work. Now the middle class is replaced by the lower class and does not perform in practice its socially important functions, does not act as an effective guarantor of political stability and the basis of democratic transformations in today’s transformational Ukrainian society.</p><p>Therefore, one of the priorities of the Ukrainian state should be firstly, creating the necessary conditions for the widespread development of the middle class, first of all, through real economic reforms aimed at realizing socio-economic, political, and spiritual interests. Secondly, the middle class should embody the best features of professionalism, individualism and tolerance, which are based on its strong positions as a working owner as a reliable guarantor of stable and sustainable social development. Thirdly, in order to form a middle class as a guarantor of political stability, there should not be a huge mass of poor people alienated from power, property and social respect.</p><p>A characteristic feature of modern Ukrainian society is that those who would have belonged to the middle class, are very close to the lower class for their low incomes and the level of satisfaction of their needs. Without the practical implementation of these logical processes, it is extremely difficult to imagine any positive prospects for the development of the middle class as the political stability of modern Ukrainian society.</p> Станіслав Сухачов Тетяна Лужанська Авторське право (c) 2018 Станіслав Сухачов, Тетяна Лужанська https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 164 170 Поняття дискурсу – перегляд визначень https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/164214 <p>The significance of the problem of the «discourse» concept definition arises from the fact that for a relatively long time, from which the concept is used in social sciences, many of its interpretations have appeared. This, thereafter, affects the selection of the discourse research methods, and in the case of the author – the research of Polish discourse in Ukraine, which has an influence on Ukrainian-Polish relations. Therefore, the article is devoted to the analysis of the «discourse» concept and is the theoretical basis for establishing the possibility of using the analysis of discourse for the evaluation of international relations, and in the narrow sense - Polish-Ukrainian relations.</p><p>As a source base, articles, monographs and theses of Polish and Ukrainian scholars have been used, and it should be noted that in Poland, discourse studies have been conducted for a long period of time and have attracted more attention of the political environment than in Ukraine, and this, accordingly, influenced the choice of sources.</p><p>The problem of defining the discourse idea is that the concept is used in many scientific disciplines, within which different schools have appeared, which have their own understanding of the discourse concept. In addition, there are also interpretations of individual researchers, who are working within these schools.</p><p>The analysis of various definitions of discourse convinced the author that the source of differences in the interpretation of the concept is the application of two philosophical traditions. One of them represents discourse as a multi-stage, logically ordered process of knowledge, and was presented by such well-known philosophers as R. Descartes and G.W. Leibnitz and gave impetus to the structuralist understanding of the concept. The second relies on the tradition of one-step moment of knowledge of the object and created a phenomenological school in the interpretation of the concept of «discourse.»</p><p>The author has considered the classical discourse theories, presented by such scholars as: Teun A. van Dijk, Michel Foucault, Jürgen Habermas and Émile Benveniste, and for his study adopted the phenomenological discourse definition by Michel Foucault, where discourse is the relation of knowledge and power and their interconnection. The discourses are organized through the episteme as a system of thinking, characteristic for a particular era or sphere. Discourse practices are the collection of anonymous rules that govern expressions for a particular era and specific environments.</p><p>The discourse interpretation in the phenomenological tradition of scientist Michel Foucault complements the work of other authors, which do not contradict the other above-mentioned interpretations, such as speech-community (community of speaking, language community), topic (concept) that unites the text, story line that arranges the discourse.</p><p>Understanding the concept of discourse as rules that outline the statement, supplemented by the concepts of other scholars, allows us to use a wide range of research methods, which were introduced by the author - subdividing extralinguistic, linguistic (textual) and methods of analyzing the dependence of language and extra-language elements.</p><p>Among the extra-linguistic methods, the analysis of SEP (somebody else’s problem is in first place) – the matter that is silent, the discourse strategy analysis, (the selection of texts, event naming, event description), priming and framing as discourse strategies.</p><p>Methods of linguistic analysis concentrate on the analysis of the text surface which occupies this topic in the media, the analysis of the semantic keyword field, the conversational analysis which focuses on the description of communicative units, including metaphors and the analysis of text strategies. Finally, the third group of methods of language matching and extra-language factors is critical discourse analysis, which establishes links between ideology, propaganda, public morals and language.</p> Sergiusz Rudnicki Авторське право (c) 2018 Sergiusz Rudnicki https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 171 178 Витоки становлення теорії модернізації як процесу соціальних змін https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/164215 <p>The origins of the scientific reflection of modernization as a social phenomenon date back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the time of the formation of evolutionary theory, which was reflected in the works of O. Cont, E. Durkheim, G. Spencer, K. Marx, etc. On the right remark of modern foreign scientists, the modernization theory – is «the phase that has in sociology and theory of the evolution been completed». Modernization, which at one time was interpreted as the emergence of a «new civilization model», forms the vector of transition from survival values to the values of selfrealization, to the further human development, which underlies a powerful emancipation potential.</p><p>Modernization in the broadest sense is considered as a process of modernizing and improvement of all spheres of social relations; in the narrow one – as a complex set of transformations, which the social system experiences on the way of the evolution from the traditional agrarian society to the urbanized industrial one. The variety of historical experience in the modernization of societies that were (are) at various stages of civilization development, or have significant differences in culture and traditions, question the possibility of a global generalization, the definition of a stable set of institutions, structures, rules or procedures within a unified theory, the deduction of the common patterns that would serve as a benchmark for all countries and peoples. . The proof of this – are the unsuccessful attempts to develop a universal theory of modernization, based on the conceptual foundations of evolutionism by scientists in the second half of the 20th century.</p><p>The development of the modernization theory started after the Second World War and disseminated in the 1950s–1960s. It should be emphasized that there was no single theory of modernization, even in the 1950s–1960s. As the researchers point out, it was rather a powerful intellectual movement. In its evolution, the modernization theory has conditionally passed three stages: 50–60, 60–70s and 80–90s of the 20th century. The liberalization of political practice and the modernization theory led to a reassessment of the idea of universal progress in historical evolution; to rethink the model of the development of civilizations, the concepts of «modernity» and «traditionalism». All this together contributed to expanding the boundaries of research and taking into account the influence of not only the center on the periphery, but also the periphery on the center.</p><p>The main thing that one managed to overcome was stereotypical ideas about the civilization mission of the West in relation to other parts of the world, as well as to realize that the future of mankind is the harmonious combination and coexistence of different cultures that are being developed in accordance with its inherent trajectories of social development, rather than in a predetermined direction. Modern science is increasingly focused on the study of unique, critical, bifurcation and other nonlinear processes, where exclusive, to some extent, random events begin to play a special role that becomes relevant to macroevolution, changing the course of human evolution. The suddenness of the social changes taking place in a globalized world does not allow us to confidently determine the perspective models of countries and nations future development. Globalization, like any large-scale process, changes the usual way of life, and, along with many benefits, has painful consequences for some social groups. Globalization, according to modern scientists, «can’t be regarded as an ordinary linear scheme, at least because it in its existence holds both development and destruction at the same time». In addition, there are new challenges that require fundamentally new approaches to their solution.</p> Валерій Бортніков Авторське право (c) 2018 Валерій Бортніков https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 179 186 Репутація політичної партії: основні підходи до її розуміння https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/164220 <p>The article studies the key approaches to understanding the reputation of one of the key subjects of the political process, i.e. of a political party. The Ukrainian society currently has a growing demand for the reputation of political parties. The author emphasizes that the most citizens of Ukraine choose apolitical party not by their political programs, but rather by their images created by the mass media. There is a solid tendency, that results of the elections depend on the reputation of a political party, which may serve as a guarantor of social stability of the society in general. That is why mass consciousness has a growingly fixed vision of reputation as a certain value, the existence of which determined the success of a political force.</p><p>The author stresses that certain aspect of the concept of “reputation” have already been studied, primarily in the political leadership theory and during the studies of images of political leaders. The understanding of a reputation has been personalized since ancient times. That is why, the article highlights and explains the personalized approach to this phenomenon. The article shows that Confucius, Laozi, Protagoras, Plato, Titus Livy, Plutarch, N. Machiavelli and others have determined a direct dependency between the welfare of whole nations and the correspondence of the ruler to a certain “ideal image”, which consisted of a number of moral and ethical qualities.</p><p>It has been determined that, unlike the reputation of a political party, the study of personal reputation is explained by a considerably late appearance of actual political parties. At the start of the process, we may remember the socalled movement of “The Populares” – a sociopolitical coalition, which started to form soon after the end of the second Punic war (218-201 BC). The first prototypes of modern political parties appear only during the periods of bourgeois revolutions and the appearance of parliamentary forms of fighting for power. The concrete examples may be the 16701680-s in England (Tory and Whigs); the 1780-1790-s in France (Jacobins and Girondins). The first parties of a modern type appear in the first half of the 19th century. On the basis of this, a conclusion is drawn that due to objective reasons, namely, the time of party formation, there is a longer history of studying the reputation of a person.</p><p>The author notes that the concept of a “reputation of a political party” is not used as a fixed term in modern political science. It is rather used in association with such terms as “brand”, “image”, “cognitive image”. At the same time, image and reputation have different purposes – image is aimed exclusively at the consumer of services whereas reputation is aimed at consumers, employees, partners, society etc. The author substantiates that personal reputation (reputation of the leader of a political party) is connected to the reputation of a political party in general. This may be seen on the examples of modern “personalized” political parties of Ukraine. Unlike the image, reputation must be suited in the context of personality, an actual living person as it may not exist separately from its bearer.</p><p>In the context of understanding the reputation of a political party, the practical contents of the concept of “sustainability of electoral preferences” is revealed. It has been determined that the shift of the reputation of a certain political party may objectively influence the shift of electoral preferences. This, in turn, may signify that a sustainable reputation of apolitical party is a certain guarantee of the sustainability of electoral preferences.</p><p>The author uses various approaches – economic, legal, sociological, communicative, systemic, socio-philosophic – to reputation analysis. In general, the study concludes that reputation of a political party must be viewed as a phenomenon of public opinion, evaluation of moral, business and professional qualities of the members of a certain party. It should be viewed as a non-material resource or a non-material assets of a political organization.</p> Олексій Буряченко Авторське право (c) 2018 Олексій Буряченко https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 187 192 Лобізм і теоретичні моделі політичної комунікації https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/164221 <p>The article highlights the importance of lobbying in conditions of modern Ukraine. The objective necessity of its existence in the society is shown. In conditions, when the state cannot sufficiently satisfy the interests of various social strata, layers and groups, this role is taken over by lobbying. The growth of its role in the society changes the vector pf democracy transformation form civic representation to representation of interests of social groups.</p><p>The article determines that today lobbying is one of the key mechanisms of development and political decisionmaking; it is a considerable and efficient force, which influences the state authorities and institutions. The efficiency of lobbying depends on the level of its actual implementation. The article reveals that the phenomenon of lobbying is in a fact a communicative phenomenon as lobbyists and government representatives use various communicative resources. The author interprets the term of “political communication” as the process of transfer, exchange of political information, which shapes the political activity and gives it a new sense, forms public opinion and is part of political socialization of the citizens with the consideration of their needs and interests. It is emphasized that today communication plays the role of the main resource of the authorities. All the resources are influenced by communication. Any message, any information exchange implies some form of resources exchange.</p><p>The author analyses various models of political communication described by H. Lasswell, M. DeFleur, J. Bordewijk, B. van Kaam, J.-M. Cotteret. Is has been determined, that of all the existing communication models, there was no model designed specifically for the analysis of communication lobbying. The presented models of political communication may describe the lobbyist contact as a process, but they all are narrowed to transfer of information, significant for political system functioning. It has been emphasized that contemporary communication theories transfer of information is crystalized into the so-called transmission model of communication. This model remains basic for the formation of understanding the nature of political communication.</p><p>The study determines that in the context of the research, J.-M. Cotteret’s model is the most appropriate way to determine the peculiarities of lobbying in the Ukrainian society. It most accurately corresponds to the realities of Ukraine, which is sometimes called “oligarch economy”. This is a particular form of structural connection between the oligarch layer of the society and its economy (also through lobbying the economic interests of oligarchs). The specifics of the Ukrainian lobbying model lies in the fact that there is a total economic dependency of party circles, which may be seen both at the nation and local levels.</p><p>It is emphasized that the key feeding source of oligarchy is parasitizing on the economic body of the state. That is why Ukrainian oligarchy received the name of “carnival-parasitizing”. And, unfortunately, corruption remains the main interaction mechanism between the power and the big business.</p><p>The author determines the current problems of the lobbying process in Ukraine. Firstly, the national legislation has no clear definition of such terms as “corruption” and “lobbying” as a form of interaction between the authorities and the interested party. The issue of lobby legalization still remains an important issue as well as the necessity of establishment of legal and lobbying principles to ensure the legitimacy of its functioning. It has been suggested to develop the methodology of carrying out the political and legal expert evaluation of draft projects and to adopt it in the form of a legal act. The necessity of ensuring the transparency of the lobbying process improving the order of drafting and deliberation of legislation at the plenary sessions of the Ukrainian parliament are emphasized.</p> Сергій Годний Авторське право (c) 2018 Сергій Годний https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 193 198 Вплив постмодерних реалій на процес трансформації політичних цінностей у світі і в Україні https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/164222 <p>This article analyzes political values of the contemporary world and Ukraine in connection with conception of postmodernism. The article has focus on political science analysis of axiology like a determinant of the political life. Postmodern epoch has emerged after disillusionment with modernism ideals and its optimism. The person`s alienation from his/her origin, the change of industrial conditions, the senseless of revolutions, humanity`s self-destruction in world wars constituted an epoch of Postmodernism.</p><p>The notion of postmodernism is described by philosophers as a new cultural tendency of Western societies. It can be characterized through the basic features such as openness and readiness for perception sociopolitical and cultural changes, freedom of self-expression, improvement of quality of life, care for ecology etc. For instance J.F. Lyotard used the concept of postmodernism to describe the condition of knowledge in the most highly developed societies.</p><p>The emergence of the phenomenon of postmodern caused by the crisis of modernism`s metaphysical philosophy. According to J.F. Lyotard, modernism is losing its functors, great hero, great dangers, great voyages and great goal. In contrast postmodernism denies any kind of ideology, dominance, violence or war for the sake of peace and agreement. It contradicts monism, unification, totalitarianism and necessity of utopias. Also it approves the idea of diversity, the competition of paradigms and coexistence of diverse elements. Otherwise the conception of pluralism is the one of the main postmodernism feature.</p><p>Postmodernism was emerged to explain the global conditions of the last decades of twentieth century. In consequence, it is intended for explaining the contemporary crisis phenomena and processes, finding new priorities, aims and tasks for humanity. That is why the transformation of social, cultural and economic lives tends to form the new basis of modern societies which faces a task of changing orientations and revaluation basic social and political values. A lot of philosophers agree to main idea of dominance the value consciousness over the ideological one. Nowadays axiological systems of the groups, societies or states become similar to each other. Political values can be considered like core and universal. They are characterized as rule of law, sovereignty, observation of human rights, individualism, freedom, equity, tolerance, peace, consensus, pluralism etc. These political values are basic for contemporary postmodern country. Despite the certain set of state`s political values postmodern nation state suffer from the tendencies of globalization which minimize the guide role of the nation state. That is why modern country needs to be rethought according to postmodern paradigm.</p><p>Ukraine also needs to rethink the current and future status of its values and its place in the world`s order. On the one hand, declared by Ukraine its euro integration vector requires acceptance universal European political values such as dominance individual values over national ones, diversity of political behavior and prevailing role of global axiology over national. On the other hand, having a system crisis inherited from Soviet Union, Ukraine should form its own national identity on basis of national idea and then implement political and national values like responsibility, justice, dignity etc. After Ukrainian achieving independence from Soviet Union new values emerged such as democracy, freedom, constitutional state, observing human rights, justice and national patriotism. They were declared as the course of Ukrainian development but the implementation had faced some difficulties like reactionaries and oligarchic groups. To O. Babkina`s mind, the actual problem of modern Ukraine is both unity of Ukraine and its contradiction from external threat of its sovereignty. Moreover the dire threat of national integrity influenced over social consolidation, invoked forming sociopolitical values and determined geopolitical vector for Ukraine. Positive factors for Ukrainian axiological system are consolidation of national idea, overcoming the value cleavage among political elites and citizens, growing patriotism of financial groups and authority.</p><p>To sum up, Ukraine is building its own Postmodern to be a competitive and perspective actor of foreign policy due to its efforts of overcoming the value cleavage of Ukrainian society and strengthen first positive achievements.</p> Анна Меньшеніна Авторське право (c) 2018 Анна Меньшеніна https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 199 204 «Фабрики думок» у США як функціональний прототип сучасних аналітичних центрів https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/164223 <p>Think tanks of the United States as a functional prototype of modern analytical centers are explored in the article. The main factors that determined the formation of think tanks in the United States in the early years of the twentieth century were distinguished, in particular: 1) the economic boom in the United States at the beginning of the 20th century; 2) course of administration of T. Roosevelt; 3) cartelization and trasification of the national economy. The process of formation of the official institutionalized elements of the system of expert-ideological influence in the 19101920 years was analyzed. The types of non-state structures of expert support of foreign policy processes of this period are distinguished, such as: 1) non-governmental think tanks, whose activities are directed on ideological substantiation, expert evaluation and advocacy support of foreign policy; 2) councils and associations created to coordinate with the assistance of scientists economic and political interests of business and the state.</p><p>The influence of the first think tanks of the USA on the public decisions making process is considered. The influence of the Industrial Revolution, private philanthropy and the Great Depression on the formation and development of American think tanks is analyzed. The influence of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Foundation on the process of the formation of think tanks in the United States is considered. The influence of the Second World War and the Cold War on the formation of expert-analytical organizations in the USA was determined. The peculiarities of the development of think tanks of the USA in the 40’s - 50’s of the twentieth century, which were caused by a new wave of expansion into the European market of American corporations and banks, were considered. The ideological and organizational changes in the work of think tanks of the USA in the 1960s were explored.</p><p>The main political events that have created the context for the distribution of disproportionately large numbers of conservative think tanks in the 1970s are analyzed, in particular: 1) political mobilization of business and corporations; 2) political conversion and aggressive propaganda by the neo-conservative intelligentsia; 3) the political mobilization of evangelical and fundamentalist Christians; 4) the prevalence of neoclassical economic theory at universities and among key politicians. The reasons that prevented the creation of non-conservative think tanks in the 1960s-early 1970s are researched, namely: 1) the adoption by Congress of a tax reform law which has tightened restrictions on the political activity of private foundations that historically are major sponsors of think tanks; 2) reducing the resources of the Ford Foundation and reducing its interest in funding analytical centers; 3) a decline in the cost of research and development of the Ministry of Defense, historically another important source of funding for think tanks in the United States.</p><p>The causes of the emergence and spread of ideologically oriented think tanks (lawyer type) in the USA in the 70s and 80s of the 20th century, which openly demonstrated commitment to a certain policy, party or ideology, carried out aggressive propaganda and sought to make influence the discussion of issues current policy are analized. The current condition of think tanks in the USA is considered.</p><p>It is established that the process of developing strategic ideas by think tanks of the United States is closely linked with the applied orientation towards obtaining specific socio-economic and political results. American think tanks are directly influenced primarily by public interests and have a close connection with the interests of large American business. They are quite different from similar organizations in other countries, with the active participation of many of them in the political process and widely funded from various sources. American think tanks are directly and indirectly ready to participate in shaping public policy, and politicians, in their turn, are appealing to them for advice.</p> Ігор Петренко Авторське право (c) 2018 Ігор Петренко https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 205 213 Мотиваційні детермінанти політичної волі https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/164225 <p>Political will acts as a key component of the political process, the understanding of the essence of political events and the development of mechanisms for the modernization of socio-political life. The systematization of the motivational factors for implementing political will in decisions of the ruling elite and consolidation of the social outlook within the framework of the national identification process will allow establishing the essence of the determination of the political process, as well as identifying the key problems of balancing the socio-political environment and rationalizing the methodology of public policy development.</p><p>Of particular importance is the above-mentioned problem within the Ukrainian socio-political space. The complexity of modernizing management institutes, regulating channels of power-public interaction and leveling up the confrontation of social initiatives requires the urgent development of algorithms for the transformation of a political system based on the materialization of social political will and the reconciliation of public expectations with the functional guides of key political actors. A prerequisite for these progressive advances is the theoretical understanding of the processes of practical implementation of the political interests of civil society in political decisions of the ruling elite, which is possible on the basis of studying the motivation of political will as the basis for reforming the socio-political sphere and the driving force of the gradual improvement of the political arrangement of the state system.</p><p>Understanding the will as a regulator of human behavior and activity is expressed in the ability to overcome internal and external difficulties in the process of the implementation of purposeful actions and actions. It is the will to control the incentive to act and act in accordance with the purpose. Will and her motivation are the most important components of the deliberate behavior of a statesman. If the motivation is primarily responsible for initiating behavior (the formation of intentions), the will is responsible for their implementation.</p><p>Considering the essence of the concept of «political will» through the prism of the practical measurement of the political process, the extraordinary value in the context of the search for the root causes and the development of mechanisms for modernizing public administration is to prevent the negative phenomena of politics - the centralization of political power and authoritarianization of the political system. After all, the greatest potential and opportunities for the implementation of motivated political will are fixed by the political actors endowed either by democratic procedures or through the form of organization of the political regime of power preferences. As with the functioning of representative democracy of the Western model with the prevalence of the legislative institution and the presidential form of the organization of political power inherent in certain countries of the post-Soviet political space, the implementation of a functional program for modeling state policy is de facto consolidated by representatives of the authorities. In any case, the political will of a separate political actor in the implementation of national policies should not prevail over the collective initiatives of civil society. Only then, representative democracy, based on the articulation of public interests by democratically oriented politicians, will not turn into a state system of an authoritarian type, where the definition of the course of foreign and domestic policy of the country will be in the plane of individual beliefs of one or more political actors.</p><p>Expansion of the motivational paradigm of political will becomes especially relevant for defining the content of democratization processes in the post-Soviet political space, including in Ukraine. The long process of formation of Ukrainian statehood was accompanied by the arrival of a number of political forces, which were marked by different political views and a change in the constitutional matrix of the organization of political space. However, not always the political will of the country’s elite to form the course of state policy was in the field of national benchmarks of the Ukrainian public. As a result, the dissonance of the political will of the authorities and public institutions has led to political activation of the public and reformatting political power on the basis of popular will. The coincidence of various factors of a subjective and objective nature put the Ukrainian state in front of the choice of a vector for further political development. Challenges are not only in the field of consolidation of public landmarks, but also in rationalizing the administrative and management system and improving the program of political actions of the ruling elite.</p><p>So, as a general conclusion, we note the following. Whatever the active role played by the will in the activity of a statesman, one can not completely deny that it is determined by a set of objective conditions and subjective factors, the material relations in which a person is. Will, as a driving force, is the concentration of energy that the subject receives from society, a form of manifestation of political activity, which includes the political consciousness and behavior of the subject of politics, and is directed, first of all, to the realization of interests and needs, related to the achievement of power, its maintenance, strengthening and use. An essential characteristic of political will is the ability of a political entity, through the appropriate volitional effort, to consistently pursue its goals and objectives in the field of political life, which involves the development, clear and clear articulation of political requirements and programs, the ability to adjust its goals and actions in relation to certain circumstances. The main motivational factors and at the same time the semantic core of the realization of political will are political values and the installation of social and individual consciousness, the political and legal culture of the subject of political activity. Volitional efforts can be related to biologically determined predispositions of the individual. Along with this, the motivation of political leaders in resolving political problems by volitional efforts is often caused by external factors, which indicates a significant reduction in their role of internal moral control. External motives can drive a policy maker in favor of a solution that will bring immediate benefits, but its long-term consequences will be negative. Therefore, when making decisions, one must always take into account the voice of conscience and think about how one or another solution will affect other people. Ideally, volitional activity of subjects of political activity should be limited not only to moral values, but also to the corresponding rules and norms. Only in this case, it will meet the idea of achieving the public good.</p> Валентина Смірнова Авторське право (c) 2018 Валентина Смірнова https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 214 222 Концепція «балансу сил» в Центрально-Європейському регіоні крізь призму російської агресії проти України: теоретико-методологічні аспекти https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/163561 <p>It substantiates theoretical and methodological basis of the comprehensive political science analysis of the transformation of new systems «balance of power» in Central Europe. The different theoretical and conceptual approaches to the understanding of the international relations system in the late XX – early XXI century and described a new balance of power model. The essential characteristics of the European security paradigm in the dimensions of establishing a «balance of power» new system in Central Europe are revealed.</p><p>It is stated that against the background of changes in the international system, there is a need to revise theoretical and conceptual approaches to the study of the concept of «balance of power», the theoretical foundations of which were laid in different from today’s world-political conditions. Analysis of the concept of «balance of power» shows that over time, its interpretation significantly changed and supplemented by new arguments, which led to the conceptual ambiguity and even blurriness. It is also noticeable differences in approaches to the «balance of power» in the foreign policy practice of different states. The very concept of force in international relations, as well as the ways of its application, evolved.</p><p>It turns out that it is safe to speak of the historicity of the principle of balance of power, the structure and content of which have changed throughout world history. The classical interpretation of political realism (the approach of G. Morgenthau) was based on the bipolar world order, the presence of two superpowers (the USSR and the USA) and two military-political blocs (NATO and ATS) in the international system. The destruction of the bipolar system forced the researchers to seek new interpretations of the balance of power. So there were modifications to the principle of balance of power for a unipolar and multipolar world. Proponents of neo-realism began to present the concept of «balance of power» through the prism of their individual concepts of a new world order, thus distorting the original meaning of the principle (K. Waltz, M. Kaplan, E. Haas).</p><p>The annexation of Crimea in the context of the destruction mechanism of «balance of power» in Central Europe is analyzed. The annexation of Crimea sets a very dangerous precedent for the future security environment in Europe, and in post-Soviet space especially. The Ukrainian conflict has also exposed weaknesses in international law, agreements and treaties, as these often allow for contradictory interpretations. The factors and potential negative consequences of forces imbalance are identified not only in Central Europe, but also in the global arena in general.</p><p>The Russian aggression against Ukraine undermined the system of international relations that had been built for decades, violated the principles of regional and global security. The annexation of the Crimea, the situation in the east of Ukraine brought fundamental changes not only in the Central European region, but also de facto in the European and transatlantic defense complex. These strategic changes not only changed the situation that existed since the end of the Cold War, but led to a paradigm shift in security policy.</p> Віра Максимець Авторське право (c) 2018 Віра Максимець https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 9 14 Націонал-соціалістичний Lebensraum у Східній Європі: між анахронізмом і злочином https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/163574 There is no other ideology like that of National Socialism where the definition of biology and geography were so distorted. It was not geopolitical interests but the social-Darwinist ideology of geopolitical needs that were the essential point for the Third Reich in its fight for existence (<em>Kampf ums Dasein</em>). In other words in the fight for living space (<em>Kampf um Lebensraum</em>) for the Arian (German) race, which was of greater value than Jews and Slavs. This equal sign between ideology and politics will enable to understand the phenomenon of the Third Reich. It’s concept of activity, based on the ideology of National Socialism – precisely described by Hitler in <em>Mein Kampf</em> – to the end of Nazi state, has been the justification and ultimately the purpose of all of the Reich’s political activities. The crucial word was <em>Lebensraum</em>, the “key-word” of National Socialism, as Theodor Heuss stated. The appropriation of politics by ideological delusions, results in the attempt to change the policy into the mechanism of “key-words”, with which the National Socialism had been trying to enter into the reality and finally to build a criminal utopia. The utopia, which in the case of a German win, will mean the full extinction of the Jews, the displacement of millions of Slavs to Siberia, re-population by the Arian <em>Herrenrasse</em> of the vast and fertile area conquered by the German troops. The maintenance of those areas will be – as it had been in previous centuries – the tasks of Slavic neo-serfdom peasants. The defeat of the Third Reich must be understood not only as the end of criminal insanity, but also as the victory over the ideology, which as the crucial point for its development perceived the extensive understanding of <em>Lebensraum</em>. This is such an interesting coincidence, that the evidence against the Nazi sophistry provides the modern statement that there was no time in history that so many Germans lived in such a small area! And never before did they live so well as they do today! Jan Wiktor Tkaczyński Авторське право (c) 2018 Ян Віктор Ткачинський https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 15 18 Пейзаж промислових відносин і суспільного діалогу на пострадянському просторі https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/163575 In the article, in relation to industrial relations in the post-Soviet states, an attempt to consolidate two theses was made. The first one refers to the system-creating role of EU membership and finds confirmation in the situation on the Estonian, Lithuanian and Latvian arenas of industrial relations. The second thesis tells of the cultural and institutional mismatch of other post-Soviet states, which is illustrated by the examples of: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Although these theses do not discover the new land, they are generally known - that is why they are given as theses and not hypotheses - but they are not cognitively empty and according to the writer, they still constitute an incentive for further completing the map of the land known for nearly thirty years as part of the widely understood post-soviet studies. The supplement proposed here refers to the characteristic features of the topography of industrial relations in the post-Soviet area. Яцек Срока Авторське право (c) 2018 Яцек Срока https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 19 27 Військова і безпекова складові внутрішньої та зовнішньої політики Російської Федерації у 2007–2014 рр. https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/163580 <p>The radical actions of the Kremlin, which led to the annexation of the Crimea and the support of the separatists in the East of Ukraine, were conditioned by fundamental changes in Russia’s domestic and foreign policy, which began much earlier and were connected with the historically determined irrational aspirations of Russians to territorial expansion. The turning point of radical changes in Russia’s domestic and foreign policy can be considered the famous speech of Putin, which he spoke at the Munich Security Conference on February 10, 2007, and openly said that he «really thinks about the problems of international security.» The main points of this report are the following: the unacceptability and impossibility for a modern world of a unipolar model of international relations; the need to find a reasonable balance between the interests of all actors in international politics; the inadmissibility of the invasion of the United States of America in all spheres of world development and the imposition of rules of the game to other states; the admissibility of the use of military force as the last argument only on the basis of the UN Charter; termination of the provocative NATO expansion to the East as reducing the level of mutual trust in the world; the hopelessness of the West’s economic policy towards the Third World countries; stopping the process of transforming the OSCE into a tool for securing the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries relative to other countries; the formation of a just, democratic world order capable of ensuring prosperity not only for the elected but for all.</p><p>Putin’s speech served as an occasion for controversy in the Western political circles to restore the «cold» war. By the Russian side, the Munich speech of Putin was seen as a further program of foreign policy of Russia in the late 2000’s - early 2010’s. External causes of radical change in the course of the Russian Federation: 1) the enlargement of NATO and the EU to the east in 2004, which took place without taking into account the interests of the Russian Federation, and this is against the backdrop of the intensified declaration of Putin after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 supporting the American strategy to combat terrorism; 2) «color revolutions» that took place in 2003-2005 in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, and were actively supported by the United States and the leading European countries. The conservative part of the Russian elite perceived them as an offensive against Russia’s interests in the post-Soviet space. Internal reasons: 1) the rise in oil prices on the world market since the early 2000’s, accompanied by a surge of foreign direct investment and a cessation of capital outflow. In conjunction with the dependence of European countries on the supply of Russian energy resources, all this generated in the higher political elite a sense of Russia’s new status as an «energy superpower» and claims to restore its role in world politics; 2) the defeat of the big business (Berezovsky, Khodorkovsky) in the struggle for power in the Russian Federation and the growing influence of the federal bureaucracy and security forces, which led by Putin to gain mass support in the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2003-2004.</p><p>After Munich in Russia, a whole series of conceptual, legislative, structural changes and organizational measures aimed at adapting state institutions and politics under new conditions was launched. The preparation and conduct of the presidential elections in Russia, which resulted in the «return» of Putin to a senior position in the state, finally severed the Kremlin, even with the possibility of establishing a pragmatic cooperation with the West, which attempts were made during the reign of D. Medvedev within the framework of the «reboot» from the United States and «Partnership for Modernization» programs with Germany and the EU.</p><p>Thus, the evolution of the domestic and foreign policy of the Russian Federation in 2007-2014 is largely due to the imperial essence of the state and society of this country, due to all its historical historical development. In addition, the subjective factor associated with the activities of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin and his oligarchic leadership headed by his desire for personal enrichment and indivisible domination in the post-Soviet geopolitical space, played a role in changing the country’s political course. Accordingly, Russian aggression against Ukraine, which began in February 2014, should be considered a natural result of the expansionist aspirations of the ruling class in Russia.</p> Андрій Демартино Авторське право (c) 2018 Андрій Демартино https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 28 34 «Рашизм» як квазіідеологія пострадянського імперського реваншу https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/163763 <p>The article is devoted to the «ruscism» – the political neologism that arose at the beginning of the 21st century to denote the quasi-ideology and social practice of the modern political regime in the Russian Federation. Key definitions of the proposed article are «ideology» as a system of beliefs and ideas, views on society and its political life, that reflects ideals, worldview, interests, mindset of people, social classes, political parties, social movements, and also includes values, normative and target tendencies and the ways of their achievement, in particular its modern concept of «expanding» (according to T. Parsons) that is being interpreted as a particular society’s system of values that is serving the universal orientation for the socio-political activities; «quasi-ideology» in the sense of «false», «imaginary» ideology and an eclectic synthesis of certain postulates; «ruscism» as the unofficial name of the quasi-ideology and social practice of the ruling regime in the Russian Federation at the beginning of the 21st century, which is an eclectic mix of imperial neo-colonialism, great-power chauvinism, nostalgia for the Soviet past, religious traditionalism, and acts as an identification mechanism within the system (recognition of «friends» and «enemies»), engagement (attracting of the new «friends»), and legitimization of conditional offenders on which all kinds of freedom supporters make claims.</p><p>The author relies on a wide range of approaches to the definition of the semantic and ideological content of the «ruscism» by Russian scholars and political analysts who represent a predominantly critical view of the current political regime of the Russian Federation (S. Belkovsky, L. Gudkov, A. Melnikov, A. Piontkovsky, A. Skobov), political and military figures of the post-Soviet space (Sh. Basayev, J. Dudayev), Ukrainian researchers (O. Grinov, O. Kaftan, O. Kostenko, O. Leusenko, V. Tkachenko, M. Tomenko and etc.), expresses own opinion regarding this phenomenon.</p><p>It is stated that the manifestation of «ruscism» in the domestic policy is the violation of human rights for freedom of thought, the persecution of dissidents, the use of mass media for misinformation of the own society and the neglect of democratic procedures. In foreign policy «ruscism» manifests itself in violation of the international law principles, the imposition of the world’s own version of historical truth, the justification of the barbarian geopolitics of the Russian Federation aimed at occupation and annexation of the other states’ territories based on the local cooperation and support of the Russian fifth columns. Nowadays «ruscism» acts as the ideological basis of the non-democratic regime in the Russian Federation also known as «putinism».</p><p>It is predicted that «ruscism» as an ideological basis of «putinism» and «putinism» itself as a kind of authoritarian political regime of the present Russian Federation can exist after Putin’s departure (resignation, escape, natural or violent death, etc.). In this case the role of the key figure of the regime will be played by another successor and such a modernization of the quasi-ideology of «ruscism» and the facade of «putinism» may be beneficial to the financial oligarchy, since it can hypothetically reduce the impact of international sanctions and isolation.</p> Борис Дем’яненко Авторське право (c) 2018 Борис Дем’яненко https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 35 40 Інформаційна політика президентів Російської Федерації і Республіки Польща щодо України https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/163797 <p>In 2013, Ukraine’s geopolitical choice was in the centre of attention of the whole world, began to take a significant part of the information space. For the authorities of the neighbouring states, it is important to know what is happening in Ukraine and, if possible, influence on situation. After the Revolution of Dignity, the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation and the initiation armed conflict in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, Ukrainian society must understand the political stance of Russia towards Ukraine. Also no less important is the position of the Republic of Poland regarding Ukraine, since it was this state until recently was considered the main advocate of Ukraine in the European Union.</p><p>Information component of the foreign policy of the states in the XXI century has a decisive influence on the formation of public opinion, the position of international institutions, international relations, the image of society and the state in the world. The purpose of this article is to find out the goals of the information policy of the presidents of Russia and Poland concerning Ukraine in the period 2014–2017. The article shows: the essence of the concept of «information policy»; the existing characteristics of the information policy of Russia and Poland concerning Ukraine; the positions of the presidents of Russia and Poland concerning Ukraine, which were published on their official sites; similarities and differences in the positions of the Russian and Polish presidents toward to Ukraine.</p><p>Having analyzed the public statements of the presidents of Russia and Poland concerning Ukraine in 2014–2017, the author finds some similarities and differences. For example, the Russian president, as a rule, tell about Ukraine and Russia’s role in issues related to Ukraine, while Polish presidents usually speak about Poland and Ukraine, focusing on Polish-Ukrainian relations. The Russian authorities, in the person of its president, divide Ukraine into power and people (the power is bad, the people need help). For the Polish authorities, at least until recently, in the official speeches of the presidents it was about Ukraine as a single whole (the people and the power that this people elected). In addition to the geopolitical interest of Russia and Poland to Ukraine, Russian authorities often tell about their economic interests in Ukraine; Poland authorities – about security issues (the dependence of the security of Poland and Europe as a whole on the situation in Ukraine). Russian authorities call the Ukrainian nationalists guilty of worsening Russian-Ukrainian relations. The Polish authorities also lately actualized the discussion of the activities of Ukrainian nationalists in the first half of the twentieth century. This issue has recently been the basis of modern PolishUkrainian relations.</p><p>The comparison of the theoretical definitions of the concept of «information policy», which was presented at the beginning of the report and the practical aspects elucidated in the process of analyzing the public statements of the presidents of the two states in 2014–2017, gives possibility to formulate another conclusion. The information policy of the Polish president is more in line with the definition – the promulgation of the official position of the president of the state, informing the society of the goals and plans of activity, and attempts to obtain public support. Instead, the information policy of the Russian president, or rather the information geopolitics, is more oriented towards the use of technologies of information and psychological influence on the individual and mass consciousness in order to form the necessary public opinion, behaviours that will meet the goals defined by the authorities.</p> Оксана Кукуруз Авторське право (c) 2018 Оксана Кукуруз https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 41 50 Джерела і методологія дослідження сучасних українсько-польських відносин https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/163800 <p>One of the most important vectors of Ukraine’s contemporary development is its active policy in bilateral relations with the leading European countries, since such a policy opens the way for recognition of its European identity and forms unlimited opportunities for international cooperation on a mutually beneficial basis. Among the closest partners and the most reliable allies of Ukraine was and remains Poland, because here, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians live, work and study without any special problems. In addition, the strengthening of strategic partnership with Poland contributes to the practical realization of the European choice of Ukraine. On the other hand, Poles are interested in the territorial integrity, independence and European orientation of Ukraine, seeing it an ally in confronting external threats.</p><p>In connection with the aforementioned one of the most important directions of the study of the state and prospects of modern Ukrainian-Polish relations is the elucidation of the sources and methodology of their comprehension comprehension. Although any classification is conditional, it is still worth trying to identify the main sources whose potential is intended to strengthen the relations between the two countries and outline the methodological aspects of their use in order to strengthen Ukrainian-Polish cooperation. First of all, such sources should include the following.</p><p><em>1. The ideological and theoretical work of the representatives of Ukraine and Poland, aimed at finding ways to deepen mutual understanding between the two peoples.</em> At the same time, particular attention should be paid to strategic considerations expressed on both sides, as well as reservations about the risks that accompany bilateral relations. Along with this, the important points for studying are the positions of people who are distinguished for their diligence, openness to mutual respect and mutual understanding. The ideological and theoretical potential of Ukrainian and Polish intellectuals, aimed at convergence, the dialogue of the cultures of the two countries, still needs to be properly studied and systematized, and can serve as an important basis for the state-building efforts of Ukraine and Poland in the future.</p><p><em>2. External and domestic legal acts and documents of strategic direction aimed at strengthening of bilateral relations.</em> This vector of relationships was already established at the turn of the 20th - 21st centuries in the relevant international legal and internal documents: the Declaration on the Principles and Main Directions of Ukrainian-Polish Relations (October 13, 1990); Treaty on Good Neighborhood, Friendly Relations and Cooperation (May 18-19, 1992); Agreement on the legal status of the Ukrainian-Polish border (January 12, 1993); Communique on the results of the meeting of the Consultative Committee of the Presidents of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland (September 27-28, 1995); Joint Statement for Understanding and Integration (May 21, 1997); Security Strategies of the Republic of Poland (2000); National Concept of Strategic Partnership Relations with the Republic of Poland (July 27, 2001); in a paper presented by the Polish political experts «The Eastern Policy of the Union in the Perspective of its Expansion through the States of Central and Eastern Europe - the Polish Point of View» (October 2003). Sufficiently strong legal and regulatory framework for bilateral relations between Ukraine and Poland is evidence of a gradual strengthening of political, economic, international legal and cultural cooperation. At the same time, a number of problems remain inadequate. First of all, it concerns border cooperation, common historical heritage, education, labor migration, etc.</p><p><em>3. Institutional system for the provision and coordination of mutual strategic interests of the two states.</em> Today, this coordination is jointly carried out by: the Advisory Committee of the Presidents of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland; Ukrainian-Polish Mixed Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation; Ukrainian-Polish and Polish-Ukrainian parliamentary groups; Permanent Ukrainian-Polish Conference on European Integration; Polish Institute in Kyiv; Ukrainian-Polish, Polish-Ukrainian forums, Foundation Research Center Poland-Ukraine and others. In addition, there are a number of research structures in each of the countries that are highly specialized in the Polish-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Polish issues. Accordingly, this direction should be monitored and the current evaluation of the effectiveness of these or other structural units should be carried out on the subject of a real impact on the quality of bilateral relations. At the same time, mutual understanding should be sought on the basis of openness, dialogue, compromise, and the avoidance of the formation of structures focused on unilateral consideration of disputed problems.</p><p><em>4.State-political decisions in the field of security policy, anti-hybrid foreign-policy threats.</em> A real threat to the entire European security system was the aggressive policy of Russia in 2014. Under these conditions, Ukraine was the leading outpost of protecting European values and democratic order. Systemic comprehension of the existing experience in a vital military-strategic sphere will help to optimize the directions of further cooperation, in particular on such important issues as: the final determination by Ukraine of the transition to international standards in the military sphere; exchanging experience of reforming the troops and maintaining their combat readiness at an appropriate level; combining the efforts of all EU countries in combating hybrid threats, as well as conducting a single foreign and security policy; consolidated actions of the European states in relation to the offending state (point of application of sanctions, embargo, etc.); to develop, on the basis of the UN, a common position on the unconditional implementation by all countries of the world of the requirements of international law and the search for ways to improve it in order to resolve non-standard situations; the study of the NATO countries by the unique Ukrainian experience of functioning the state in a hybrid war.</p><p><em>5. The ideological and theoretical potential of public events (scientific conferences, debates, discussions, official meetings) that promote reconciliation with respect to controversial historical events, the dissolution of persistent stereotypes.</em> From time to time, the recurrence of historical hostility between the two neighboring countries is given significant, including at the official level. First of all, these are the negative manifestations of mutual opposition, such as: the war of monuments to the dead Poles and Ukrainians; the dissemination at the level of mass consciousness of outdated stereotypical ideas humiliating national dignity; attempts to politicize the policy of memory through speculation on the tragic events of the past, in which the representatives of both nations suffered; the criticisms of the Polish radicals about the re-establishment of the Commonwealth at the borders of 1939 and the ill-conceived statements of some Ukrainians, which prompted «to forget about Poland for 25 years». The realization by Poland of offensive historical politics in Ukraine creates a reciprocal reaction in the issue of Ukraine’s implementation of its policy of memory and causes various kinds of distortions. Therefore, under the current conditions, monopolization of the policy of memory at the state level, without involving the general public, is extremely dangerous for the future. This remark applies to both Poland and Ukraine.</p><p>Thus, despite current problems, today we have every reason to state the significant level of Ukrainian-Polish cooperation. At the same time, in the bilateral relations between Ukraine and Poland it is worth looking first and foremost on positive things, consolidating in the mass consciousness what unites the two Eastern European countries, to highlight the views of people who for years build a Polish-Ukrainian understanding: translate books, establish scientific cooperation, restore cemeteries, collect help for soldiers who guarantee European security in eastern Ukraine. The progressive forces of both countries, regardless of the various kinds of provocations, should be abstracted from the insinuations of the marginal environment, reveal wisdom in assessing historical events, and determine common priorities not only for the medium term, but also for the long-term perspective. The level of mutual relations between the two countries depends on the possibility of realizing the needs of national minorities - Ukrainian in Poland and Polish in Ukraine. In addition, the strengthening of intergovernmental cooperation will contribute to establishing closer cooperation between Ukrainian and Polish societies in general, which depends largely on the future of both countries in the European House of Spies.</p> Володимир Горбатенко Авторське право (c) 2018 Володимир Горбатенко https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 51 57 Становище Німеччини у справі співпраці з Росією: нові тенденції і окремі проблеми у другій декаді XXI століття https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/163803 <p>The paper synthetically presents new trends and selected issues concerning Germany’s stance vis-à-vis Russia in the second decade of the 21st century. It concentrates on an analysis of the following substantive issues:</p><p>– draft of the essence of domestic political shifts in Germany and Russia in international context;</p><p>– presentation of general assumptions featuring the new strategy in German policy vis-à-vis Russia;</p><p>– showing principal challenges as well as selected problems of German cooperation with Russia in the period 2014-17;</p><p>– underscoring new tendencies in Russia’s impingement on Germany together with German judgments as to Russia’s international role in the era of the Ukrainian crisis in light of opinion polls.</p>Over the years 2003-17, as a result of internal changes in Germany, a multi-party system took on a shape that made it harder to create a coalition and a new government after the parliamentary election of September 24, 2017. In Russia, in turn, the authoritarian government system with president Vladimir Putin at the helm strengthened. President Putin, through the annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in Donbas, begot to the persistent destabilization of Ukraine. The above mentioned developments were accompanied by a transition from the post-Cold War, unipolar international system, with the United States on top, towards a multipolar international system with the rising significance of China and Russia. Russia transformed into a geopolitical “competitor” of its strategic partner, Germany. On the other hand, Germany – as a leading EU and NATO state – together with France attempted to solve the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. It managed merely to achieve a partial armistice in Donbas within the framework of the OSCE mission (the Second Minsk Agreement from February 12, 2015). Due to the strong political and economic ties, Germany solely and temporarily suspended some forms of contact and cooperation with Russia and decided to reintroduce them in 2015. Germany engaged in hammering Western sanctions against Russia and their implementation during 2014-18. It concurrently supported Ukraine in its endeavors to achieve association with the EU in 2016. Simultaneously, Russia took advantage of its trump cards in the form of its presence in Germany (“Russian Germans”, media: Sputnik and RT as well as sympathy in some political and social circles) to prop up anti-Western and populist tendencies in this country. Erhard Cziomer Авторське право (c) 2018 Erhard Cziomer https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2019-04-15 2019-04-15 8 58 70 Взаємовідносини по лінії Москва – Мінськ у рамках енергетичного сектору https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/163842 A paper entitled <em>Cooperation between Moskow and Minsk in the energy sector</em> describes the most important problems of gas and petrol market at the European part of former USSR. It is an attempt to answer questions aroused by the situation at the post-soviet petrol market. Its analytical part is based on statistical data, analytical papers of the most important think-tanks in that matter, books and papers together with internet resources. All above mentioned contribute to an author`s proper arguments which are focused on abilities and limitations of petrol and gas sector of Russian Federation and Republic of Belarus. The paper provides an information about bilateral relations of these countries, describes Russian energy strategy towards pos-soviet area, especially towards the Belarus` role. It also describes Russian-Belarusian relations in broad international context and also Belarusian dilemmas while Minsk does refuse Russians to obtain strategic importance in the country`s energy sector on the one hand, but also must strictly cooperate with Moscow while Belarusian economy is unable to function without cheap petrol and gas supplies from Russia. An author focuses also on Yamal pipeline and the eventual threat from the Nord-Stream project and also describes the meaning of BTS1 and BTS2 installations which virtually are the pressure tools on Belarus. He characterizes the background of past and current energy conflicts in bilateral relations and indicates the role of petrol and gas as political tools at Russian disposal, towards Belarus. He also formulate prognosis, based on his past analyzes. According to an author Belarus must solve the problem of its own dependency on Moscow in the energy area. Without it she won`t be a clearly independent state. In the same time Russia is using all possible tools and strengths it monopoly on the Belarusian petrol market. This kind of policy is a step in Russian Federation`s policies aimed at regaining imperial role again in the post-soviet area. Роберт Клачиньскі Авторське право (c) 2018 Роберт Клачиньскі https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 71 76 Інтеграційно-дезінтеграційні процеси у Молдові https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/163866 <p>Moldova had to deal with the disintegration-integration challenges from the very beginning of the formation of an independent state unlike Ukraine, which at the early stages of independence did not recognize the urgency of ethnonational problems at the state level, did not pay attention to ethnopolitical threats. Issues of ethnopolitical integration and disintegration are among the most important in the field of ethnopolitical security and ethnonational policy of this multiethnic state with very complicated ethnopolitical heritage. Ukraine did not take advantage of the ethnopolitical experience of Georgia and Moldova in the past, now all three post-Soviet states (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia) are at the post-desintegration stage of development, which means the presence of self-proclaimed republics in their territorial composition, the settlement of armed ethnicpolitical conflicts and the policy of reintegration of the occupied territories.</p><p>In fact Moldova’s disintegration began before the formation of an independent state in the course of the collapse of the USSR. Its cause was the Transnistrian ethnopolitical conflict, which is considered one of the most controversial in the post-Soviet space, although the ethnic factor did not play a decisive role in it. In the late 1980s, the nationalist movement for the restoration of the state gained popularity in the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. The Moldovan elite tried to build the state around the formation of the national-linguistic identity of its citizens. An important element in the restoration of Moldavian identity was the political course of ethnopolitical, ethnolinguistic integration of Moldova with ethnic, linguistic and historically close country - Romania. This triggered the separation of Transnistria.</p><p>The Transnistrian conflict has been under regulation for more than 25 years, but the prospects for restoring the territorial integrity of Moldova and the Transnistria reintegration are very small. During numerous talks with Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE, it was not possible to reach agreement on the status of Transnistria. The Moldovan leadership refused to conduct direct talks with leaders of the unrecognized republic, stressing that it is necessary to negotiate with Russia, which writes the script of the negotiation process and manipulates leaders of self-proclaimed state.</p><p>The regulation of the Transnistrian conflict was significantly hampered by the integration trends between Moldova and Romania, which did not lead to the ethnopolitical integration of both states, but became a hindrance to the reintegration of Transnistria into Moldova. Moldova balances between an association with Romania and an orientation towards Russia, depending on which political forces - pro-Russian or pro-Romanian gained power in the state. Ethnopolitical integration with Romania meant a loss of statehood and a lasting loss of hope in resolving the Transnistria conflict by returning the territory of an unrecognized republic to Moldova.</p><p>Moldova is an example of an unstable post-Soviet state, an ethno-political system that contains many ethnic and territorial contradictions, are dependent on foreign policy players, in which disintegration-integration processes balance each other, preventing the state from advancing in any direction of integration/disintegration. The political course on the ethnopolitical integration of Moldova with Romania hinders the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, the reintegration of the territories of an unrecognized republic into Moldova and threatens further disintegration - the secession of Gagauzia. Therefore, this post-Soviet state, full of internal contradictions, has not succeeded in any direction - both integration with Romania and overcoming the consequences of disintegration. But, despite the fact that Moldova did not restore territorial integrity, it retained statehood and sovereignty.</p> Віра Явір Авторське право (c) 2018 Віра Явір https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 77 81 Ціна як вартість, що впливає на феноменологію польської злочинності проти промислової власності https://journals.uran.ua/spup/article/view/163868 The article entitled: „Price as a value affecting the phenomenology of Polish crime against industrial property” depicts the potential impact of products’s prices on the phenomenon of crime. The article begins with the analysis of consumers’s and producers’s behavior on the illegal market (a.k.a. grey area). Specifying, author describes the law of supply and demand in the terms of organized crime. In the text the reader gets to know definition of a trademark in the Polish legal system. In what follows the modus operandi of criminal groups counterfeiting trademarks is presented. Futhermore writer not only researches falsifications of goods in Poland, but also formulates statistical date (police, judicial and penitentiary). The paper ends with the comparison of illegal activity to enterprise. Mateusz Nowak Авторське право (c) 2018 Mateusz Nowak https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2018-11-15 2018-11-15 8 82 94