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RESEARCH ON THE ECONOMIC PROSPECTS OF FORMING THE UKRAINIAN ETHNIC NETWORK

The object of research is the ethnic network – a new phenomenon of the globalized world.

The paper explores the possibilities of forming a Ukrainian ethnic network in the conditions of forced migration caused by a full-scale invasion. When studying this issue, the essence of the “bamboo network” (ethnic network) or, so-called, Oversea Chinese Business Networks (OCBN) is clarified, its significance in the economic development of the People’s Republic of China. Using the example of China, the prerequisites for the formation of the “bamboo network” are identified. These include: the formation of permanent national centers within certain territorial boundaries through permanent emigration; the formation of close ties with the mother state; the presence of economic and political ties between countries. It is also investigated that important prerequisites are the presence or absence of a dominant ideology and nationalist idea in the recipient country; the formation of an entrepreneurial culture and the presence of entrepreneurial abilities in migrants. The work draws attention to the level of cultural, spiritual and educational development of emigrants and explores the role of social capital, as it significantly affects the formation of an ethnic network.

The work summarizes the challenges of migration faced by donor countries, recipient countries and migrants in particular; identifies the features of each wave of Ukrainian migration; examines the portrait of Ukrainian migrant. It also identifies factors that hindered the construction of Ukrainian ethnic network during each of the migration waves, despite the significant centers of Ukrainian migrants abroad.

Based on the research, the prospects for the development of an ethnic network at the present stage and in the future were analyzed, and the importance of the state as the main actor in the process of establishing relationships with Ukrainian migrants abroad was substantiated.

The results of this research are important for countries facing significant population outflows caused by migration, as they will allow to consider ethnic networks as one of the factors that can reduce the negative impact of migration on the economy of the donor country.

Keywords: OCBN, bamboo network, ethnic network, migration, bamboo economy, migration wave, social capital.

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1. Introduction

Each country faces a number of challenges (economic, demographic, technological, cultural, social, etc.), overcoming which, the state must contribute to ensuring the well-being of its citizens, improving their quality of life, meeting their needs, achieving sustainable development goals, etc. This can be achieved through economic growth. Therefore, there is a constant search for new factors of economic growth or other ways to use the same factors.

In recent years, the concept of “Chinese OCBNs” – Oversea Chinese Business Networks, which is better known as the “bamboo network” – has appeared in the scientific literature. This economic phenomenon is considered as one of the factors of rapid growth of the Chinese economy, and the possibilities of using similar networks by countries suffering from high migration of their own population are also being explored.

For Ukraine, which lost a significant part of its population due to war and forced migration, the existence of similar networks can be of great importance for economic growth. Therefore, understanding the conditions of their formation, historical analysis of the reasons for the lack of formation of the Ukrainian network, despite the significant migration flow of Ukrainians over the past two centuries, will allow to take these aspects into account in the future when developing a socio-economic development strategy for Ukraine in the post-war period.

The problem of “Chinese OCBNs” (Oversea Chinese Business Networks) (“bamboo networks”, ethnic networks) is not yet the object of scientific research among Ukrainian scientists, although various aspects of the study of social capital were covered in works [1–11].

Works [12–17] reflect the results of research on the “bamboo economy” by representatives of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and emigrants from this country working in the USA, Australia, etc.

That is why research into the conditions of functioning of the “bamboo network” (ethnic network) and the prospects for building a Ukrainian ethnic network in conditions of forced migration of Ukrainians are becoming particularly relevant.

The aim of the paper is to clarify the essence of the concept of “bamboo network”, identify restraining factors and study the prospects for building a Ukrainian ethnic network at the present stage and in the future. This will allow developing a system of measures for the formation of social capital between Ukrainian migrants and Ukrainian economic entities, which can become one of the drivers of economic growth.

2. Materials and Methods

The study of the identified problem involved the use of general philosophical methods of cognition. Thus, the prerequisites and conditions for the functioning of the “bamboo network”, the features of

Ukrainian migration during each of the waves, the factors blocking the development of the Ukrainian ethnic network were investigated using the methods of analysis, synthesis and generalization, and the prospects for the creation of an ethnic network at the present stage and in the future were analyzed. The methods of comparative and statistical analysis made it possible to properly assess the dynamics of migration processes from Ukraine in 2022–2024, the main directions of emigration of Ukrainians and an approximate portrait of a Ukrainian migrant during each of the waves of migration. Using the methods of logical generalization, descent from the abstract to the concrete, and historical and logical assessment, the consistency of the research was ensured.

3. Results and Discussion

The concept of “bamboo network” (ethnic network) is associated with China. “Bamboo Networks” or Oversea Chinese Business Networks are networks of economically active citizens and enterprises that were created and managed by Chinese migrants who settled abroad. In fact, they are informal and formal networks that include family and community ties, as well as business associations that have formed over the centuries, based on migration waves from China. They have deep historical roots, dating back to the early Chinese diaspora, and are the result of unique cultural, economic and social factors. They are often based on family and ethnic ties, as well as shared values and traditions. These networks play an important role in the global economy, providing support for enterprises in new countries, developing international trade relations and contributing to economic growth in both the countries where they are based and in partner states.

Literally, Oversea Chinese can be translated as “Overseas Chinese”, which is used by Zhuang Guotu only in an economic and geographical sense, when he refers to the Chinese who live under the capitalist system and outside mainland China. In political terms, Oversea Chinese (“Overseas Chinese”) refers to Chinese citizens with Chinese passports who live outside China, and does not include people from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan [12].

Thus, the “bamboo network” is understood as the connection that has been established between companies founded by Chinese emigrants (of different generations) and the Chinese economy itself.

An in-depth study of the essence of the “bamboo network” (ethnic network) allowed to identify the factors that influence its formation. In our opinion, the latter depends on:

1. *Trust*, which is one of the key factors of cooperation and information exchange in the community, a connecting element of all network participants. It is worth noting that trust can be formed only in the presence of common values, norms or expectations.

2. *Reputation*, which is formed on the basis of compliance with the agreements established by the network (for example, fair or unfair rules of the game) and assistance to other network members. At the same time, the reputation of network members can affect access to resources and opportunities of both the entire network and its individual participants.

3. *Access to information* (about markets, technologies and other resources that are not available to them outside the network). Such information can help network participants make more informed and effective economic decisions.

4. *Mutual assistance*. Network participants provide each other with assistance and support (for example, loans, contacts and advice). Such assistance is especially important for the development of small and medium-sized businesses in those countries where the network participant emigrates.

5. *Social ties* (including between network participants), which make the latter more resilient and adaptable to change, as well as more attractive to new members.

Thus, social capital plays an important role in the formation and development of the “bamboo network”, as it enables ethnic, business and family networks to be more competitive and adaptive in the global market.

So, from the perspective of social capital, the “bamboo network” is a set of family or ethnic relationships, as well as those relationships that are close to the concepts of family, household, nation, which are organically built on traditional business relationships. As a result, financial, investment and trade activities between the subjects of such relationships are simplified. The basis of such simplification is the acceleration of communications between families and representatives of the same nation in different countries, the reduction of the amount of economic risk from family relationships and the increased level of trust between the participants in such relationships.

The “bamboo network” begins to form in the 70s–80s of the 20th century in Southeast Asia, where its centers were such centers of trade and economic life as Bangkok, Hong Kong, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Macau, Manila, Singapore, Taipei, Ho Chi Minh City, which were concentrated in a large number of the Chinese diaspora [15, 16]. And already starting from the 21st century, post-colonial Southeast Asia has become one of the main foundations of China’s economy abroad, and the “bamboo network” itself acts as a symbol that is relayed as an expanded international economic outpost of China.

The creation of the “bamboo network” was largely facilitated by Deng Xiaoping’s state policy, which is well characterized by the report of the top leadership of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the People’s Political Consultative Conference: “... if to talk about China, it does not have so many opportunities for significant development. However, unlike other countries, it has its own special capabilities. For example, there are several tens of millions of overseas patriots who have already made a significant contribution to the development of the country” [18].

“The Bamboo Network or Oversea Chinese Business Networks are seen as a factor in accelerating China’s development for several reasons:

1. Enterprises owned by Chinese migrants opened China’s access to international markets and resources. These enterprises became a bridge between external demand and exports from China, contributing to the growth of the latter.

2. Chinese migrants who had connections abroad created conditions for the inflow of foreign investment into China, provided China with access to the latest technologies, management practices and knowledge. All this contributed to the modernization of Chinese industry, increasing its competitiveness and the development of the Chinese economy.

3. Chinese migrants who were part of these networks brought with them valuable experience in the fields of management, entrepreneurship and international relations, which allowed China to quickly learn and adapt to international standards and requirements.

That is, the “bamboo network” can significantly increase the inflow of investments and capital from the country where the population emigrated, increase the number of business partners and the volume of trade transactions.

Since the ethnic network creates a number of advantages for the donor country, it is worth considering the conditions for its formation:

1. *Creation of long-term, stable national centers within certain territorial or geographical boundaries through permanent emigration*. If the emigrating population settles without centers, then it assimilates much faster with the local population, reducing the level of social identification with the donor state. In the presence of centers of migration, the population, although it adapts to new conditions and environment for a longer time, nevertheless retains cultural, social and economic ties with the state from which they left for a longer time. If there is a constant influx of migrants, then there is no process of fading of national identity in old centers. At the same time, it is much easier for newly arrived migrants to enter a new environment, because in the first months of their stay abroad they are able to partially use their language, way of life, and established behavior. For Ukrainians, such centers have long been such American states as New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey (about 77 % of all Ukrainians who arrived in the USA were concentrated there) and the Canadian provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, where 3/4 of all immigrants from Ukraine settled [19].

A constant flow of migrants to the centers is necessary because the children of migrants who have reached adulthood do not often remain to live within their maternal (ethnic) community. At the same time, even the bulk of first-generation immigrants over time “move to live in the suburbs, freeing up space for migrants of subsequent waves of emigration” [20]. Thus, the ethnic environment is capable of self-preservation only due to the stable appearance of newly arrived migrants. According to the researchers, “only when the immigration flow decreases, ethnic neighborhoods change their appearance, new residents appear there, and these neighborhoods are either preserved as a tourist attraction (Little Italy in New York or the North Shore district in San Francisco), or they completely cease to exist” [20]. As a result, the growth of the “bamboo network” stops.

2. *Migration of low-skilled labor and labor with a high level of cultural, spiritual and/or educational development.* The initial formation of the “bamboo network” is impossible without the migration of low-skilled labor, since such migrants are more difficult to assimilate with local residents, more difficult to perceive the local language, are not capable of rapid retraining, subsequent internal migration within the country. As a result, it is low-skilled migrants who contribute to the emergence of centers of language, traditions, everyday life (food, housing, etc.), schools and clubs where the emigrant’s native language is taught and taught. At the same time, along with the low-skilled labor, which is needed to create the network itself between the recipient and donor countries in relation to the migrant, highly skilled migrants are also needed. It is the latter who will be able to support the movement of resource flows (informational, monetary, material, etc.) between countries after the formation of this network. That is, highly skilled migrants who arrive in the next waves of migration are able to transform passive emigration centers into a really functioning network, becoming the element that connects the two countries with financial, material, and cultural ties. Since it is the high level of development of the next generations of migrants that allows for the creation of joint ventures, enables foreign trade between states in the network, the establishment of stable business communications, etc.

3. *Close ties with the “mother” state.* The population that was forced to migrate to a hypothetical Canada or Germany during or after hostilities will not maintain ties with their home country if they have no relatives and property in the country. Family ties, on the contrary, create an additional desire for the emigrant to help their relatives in their homeland (monetary assistance, financing of special funds that cooperate with the “mother” state, assistance in combating a certain element, financing of cultural projects, etc.).

The example of Vietnam is relevant, where after the unification in the 1950s, a strict policy of assimilation of ethnic Chinese began. This led to mass migrations (“boat people”): in 1975–1979, about 200 thousand ethnic Chinese migrated directly from Vietnam to China, and about 300 thousand ethnic Chinese to the countries neighboring Vietnam [17, 21]. In Vietnam, after the assimilation policy, 4 concepts appeared to define the Chinese population: “hua” – descendants of ethnic Chinese who arrived in this country before the middle of the 20th century; “ngai” – descendants of migrants from the provinces of Guangxi and Hainan; “san deo” – descendants of migrants from the province of Guangdong; Vietnamese of Chinese origin [17]. After the stabilization of ethnic relations in Vietnam, the Chinese in Vietnam have quite close ties with China (mostly through family ties) – close economic contacts are established, which are quite often associated with political lobbying of the interests of the PRC in Vietnam.

4. *The absence of a dominant ideology and nationalist idea in the country receiving migrants.* This is the reason why Ukrainians in Canada and the USA have preserved their identity, but not in Poland and the Czech Republic, and why a Ukrainian ethno-economic network has not been created, despite the proximity to the donor country [22–26].

If to take the example of China, it is possible to observe a weakening of ties with such states as Malaysia and Brunei, where in the early 50s of

the 20th century the share of Chinese was 40 % and 25 %, respectively. And today the number of ethnic Chinese has decreased in Malaysia to 32 %, and in Brunei to 11 %. These events are due to the implementation of a specific type of policy in these countries: in Malaysia, a demographic policy is being implemented, which is aimed at increasing the growth rate of the country’s indigenous population, and in Brunei, there is a “political persecution” of ethnic Chinese, which significantly reduces the potential for the implementation of the “bamboo network” [17]. The assimilation policy of ethnic peoples was also implemented in Singapore. In this state, about 75 % of the total population is Chinese, but in an attempt to create a Singaporean identity, the country’s authorities determined that schooling should be conducted in English, and Chinese was designated as a second additional language. This significantly accelerated the process of assimilation of many peoples of the country, slowing down the potential for the use of the “bamboo network” by the People’s Republic of China [17].

5. *The presence of economic (international trade, joint ventures, common currency) and political (diplomatic missions) ties between the donor country and the recipient country.* If the state to which migrants have arrived pursues a closed policy, this will lead to the attenuation of the development of the network.

6. *Entrepreneurial abilities and entrepreneurial culture of migrants.* The presence of entrepreneurial abilities and a developed entrepreneurial culture among migrants will be a stimulating factor for engaging in entrepreneurial activities, seeking new opportunities for cooperation both within the country and abroad.

7. *Concentration of migrants in cities.* In rural areas, traditions and customs are preserved longer, so migrants who settled in villages assimilated more quickly with the local population. In cities, migrants usually settle quite compactly, which allows them to maintain their previous identity for a long period, as a result of which their assimilation occurs quite slowly [20]. Therefore, a more stable connection with the donor country is formed, which makes it possible to create a “bamboo network”.

What Ukraine and China have in common is that the emigration of citizens of these countries has led to the creation of stable national centers in the host country. The latter, with certain state support, can become a significant driver for the creation of an ethnic network. That is why we consider it necessary to analyze the conditions for the formation of a Ukrainian ethnic network.

In Ukraine, by 2022, 4 waves of migration were distinguished, each of which has its own characteristics:

– *The first wave of migration (1861–1914).* Ukrainians migrated from Western Ukraine due to landlessness, unemployment, and overpopulation. They settled where farmers, loggers, and miners were needed (cheap labor). It was these migrants who formed the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and the USA [27].

– *The second wave of migration (1920–1930).* The reasons for the departure of these emigrants were political – they were fleeing the Soviet occupation. Young and middle-aged people left, who were representatives of both low-skilled labor (peasants) and intelligentsia. The latter played an important role in the development of the diaspora, since literary circles and publications, sports sections were born at this time [27].

– *The third wave (1947–1953).* In Canada, the emigrants of this wave were considered political refugees. Among the emigrants were not only representatives of Western Ukraine, as in the previous two waves, but a large number of citizens were from Eastern Ukraine. Migrants of this wave were mostly scientists and intellectuals who adhered to the idea of the independence of Ukraine and the restoration of its statehood. These immigrants contributed to the political, cultural, religious and social development of the diaspora. Of course, there was no cooperation between the Soviet leadership and the Ukrainian diaspora. In addition, the Soviet authorities called these representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora fascists and traitors to the homeland [27].

– *The fourth wave (1980–2000).* These emigrants were significantly different from the previous ones. First, some of them went to visit relatives and then stayed there, but most left because of the economic crisis. Secondly, most of them knew the language and had higher education, so they wanted to assimilate more quickly with the citizens of the country to which they immigrated. Thirdly, the majority retained the Soviet worldview and Russian as a spoken language, and therefore they were indifferent to everything Ukrainian abroad (culture, language, traditions) [27].

The full-scale invasion provoked an intensification of migration processes, namely forced emigration (the 5th wave caused by the full-scale invasion). According to various estimates, 6–8 million people left Ukraine. Thus, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine,

as of June 21, 2023, 8 million 177 thousand Ukrainians were abroad. The largest number of Ukrainian migrants was in Poland (22%), Germany (14.6%) and the USA (11%) [28].

And as of December 16, 2024, according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 6,253,700 people had left Ukraine [29]. According to this data, most of them are in three countries: Germany, russia, and Poland (Fig. 1).

The gender and age structure of Ukrainian refugees in neighboring EU member states shows that about 50% are children aged 0 to 19, and women make up 85% of the adult population. Overall, the share of women and children in the structure of Ukrainian refugees in neighboring EU member states as of May 2023 was highest in Poland – 87%, followed by Hungary (84%), Moldova and Slovakia (83% each), Fig. 2.




Fig. 1. Share of Ukrainian refugees in the world as of December 2024 (according to UN data [29]), %




Fig. 2. Share of women and children in the structure of Ukrainian refugees in neighboring EU member states as of May 2023 [30]

At the same time, about 63 % of respondents had the status of employed before leaving Ukraine and about 1 person in 5 had the status of self-employed or entrepreneur [30]. It is also important to note that a significant share of female respondents had a master's degree (in the field of education – 43 %, in the hotel and restaurant business sector – 35 %) and a diploma of complete vocational education (in the field of providing professional administrative services – 20 %) [30]. The high level of education of Ukrainian migrants is confirmed by data from the employment services of the countries where Ukrainians are located. Thus, among Ukrainians registered in the country of residence in 2022, the share of people with higher education was: in Germany – 78 %, in the United Kingdom – 79 %, in Ireland – 68 %, in Switzerland – 64 %, in Spain – 62 %; in Belgium – 52 % [31].

That is, the 5th wave of migration is characterized by the departure of a significant number of working-age women and children who do not hide the fact that they are Ukrainians. Migrants have a high level of education and developed entrepreneurial skills, as well as a desire to work.

Forced migration after 24.02.2024 created challenges for the migrants themselves, recipient countries and Ukraine (Table 1).

Along with the challenges, each of the subjects received certain opportunities: for example, internally displaced persons received temporary protection, a residence permit, access to social security, the opportunity to adapt to the environment in which they found themselves, etc. Some of the Ukrainian migrants were able to find work or open their own business. According to the Polish Economic Institute, 59,758 companies were founded by Ukrainian citizens in Poland between January 2022 and June 2024 (Fig. 3).

Table 1

Challenges caused by forced migration of Ukrainians after February 24, 2024

Challenges for migrants	Challenges for Ukraine	Challenges for recipient countries
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Forced and unplanned departure. – Lack of knowledge of a foreign language. – Desire to have a social status and/or income not lower than in Ukraine. – Loss of qualifications. – Poor social ties. – “Separation” of families. – Inability to return to their hometown due to occupation or complete loss of property. – Difficult psychological state (deterioration of mental health). – Integration into the education system (for migrants with children). – Discrimination and xenophobia. – Preservation of cultural identity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Population decline and changes in the sex-age structure of society. – Aging of the nation. – Labor shortage. – Decrease in aggregate demand and GDP. – Decrease in tax revenues. – Adaptation of the education system (distance learning of children abroad). – Deterioration of the mental health of migrants and the introduction of a psychological assistance system. – Return of migrants after the end of hostilities. – Preservation of the cultural identity of migrants abroad 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Strengthening international cooperation on social security of migrants. – Increasing expenditures from the state budget for state programs. – Burden on the social security system. – Increasing costs for training and retraining of migrants. – Integration into the education system (adaptation of children to educational programs). – Lack of housing for migrants. – Increasing competition in the labor market between migrants and the population of the host country. – Growing social tension and an increase in the number of conflicts on an ethnic, national, cultural, religious, and political basis. – Return of migrants after the end of hostilities




Fig. 3. The number of companies founded by Ukrainian citizens in Poland in 2022–2024 (as of January 14, 2025) is based on data from the analytical portal [32]

According to the report of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as of the third quarter of 2023, among the countries studied, the highest employment rate of displaced Ukrainians was in Lithuania (66%), the Netherlands (55%), Estonia (54%) and the United Kingdom (52%), Fig. 4.

Employment of Ukrainians contributed to the economic growth of Central and Eastern European countries, which last year, according to Raiffeisen Bank International, amounted to 2.2% [34].

Along with the challenges for Ukraine caused by forced migration, there are also opportunities that can be obtained from such migration. One of these opportunities is the construction of an ethnic network, which, according to researchers, can significantly increase the inflow of investments and capital from the country to which the population emigrated, increase the number of business partners and the volume of trade transactions, etc.

Positive trends in the formation of the Ukrainian ethnic network were observed after the first wave of migration – the government of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (WUPR) established broad diplomatic contacts with a number of European countries (representative offices were opened in Austria, Italy, Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia), special missions were created in countries where

a significant number of Ukrainian migrants were (Canada, USA, Brazil). However, the loss of statehood in December 1922 slowed down the process of forming the ethnic network. The main blocking factors that restrained the process of forming the ethnic network, in our opinion, are:

- the occupation of Ukraine by the Soviet regime, accusations of migrants by the Soviet authorities, political persecution, deprivation of the right of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR) to conduct its own foreign policy activities;
- a strict assimilation policy implemented by the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), as a result of which citizens did not identify themselves as representatives of a separate nationality. Therefore, the 4th wave of migration was significantly different from the previous ones;
- during the time of independent Ukraine (the 90s of the twentieth century) the state’s disinterest in forming such ties (misunderstanding of their advantages). Also, migrants’ misunderstanding that not only cultural ties but also economic ties can be maintained with Ukraine.

Thus, it is important to investigate the type and level of formation of relationships between the diaspora and their country of origin (Table 2).




Fig. 4. Employment rate of displaced Ukrainians in selected OECD countries in Q3 2023, % [33]

Table 2

Diaspora relations with the country of origin

Type of relationships	Ukraine	China
1	2	3
Economic relationships		
Remittances	After 2014, the share of remittances in GDP increased from 5.5 to 8–12% during 2016–2023 [35]	During 2012–2023 [36], the volume of personal remittances amounted to 0.13–0.3% of GDP
Investments	Until 2022, the largest share of foreign direct investment (FDI) came from Cyprus [37]. In 2024, Cyprus ranked 2nd in terms of FDI (1.13 billion USD), meaning that the diaspora is not actively involved in investment [38]	OCBN creates global business networks. The top 10 countries-investors of the PRC in January–December 2015 included Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Macau, where a significant proportion of the local population is Chinese [39]. According to the National Institute for Strategic Studies, the share of Huaqiao in the total volume of foreign investment in China in early 2010 reached 80% [40]

Continuation of Table 2

1	2	3
Socio-cultural relations		
National permanent centers	During the four waves of migration, centers were established in Canada, the USA, and Argentina. At the present stage, there are centers in some European countries. Since 2014, the number of international organizations whose activities are aimed at supporting Ukrainians abroad has been increasing. These include such organizations and public initiatives as Global Ukraine [41], Promote Ukraine [42], and the Sunflower Project [43]. However, there is no strategic approach to cooperation with Ukrainian migrants	Permanent centers have been formed not only in neighboring countries (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia), but also in the USA (3 million), Canada and Peru (1.5 million each). There are quite numerous "Huaqiao" communities in Great Britain (500 thousand), France (300 thousand), Russia (200–400 thousand) [40]
Educational and cultural programs	During the four waves of migration, centers were established in Canada, the USA, and Argentina. At the present stage, there are centers in some European countries. Since 2014, the number of international organizations whose activities are aimed at supporting Ukrainians abroad has been increasing. These include such organizations and public initiatives as Global Ukraine [41], Promote Ukraine [42], and the Sunflower Project [43]. However, there is no strategic approach to cooperation with Ukrainian migrants	Strategic plans for the development of education and culture among migrants. For example, the PRC has developed the Eighth Five-Year Plan for Chinese living abroad and their families [44]. Specific tasks are to improve knowledge among emigrants about their rights as Chinese citizens, as well as the rights that protect the interests of ethnic minorities and diasporas in the host country
Popularization of national culture in the world	Cultural initiatives of the Ukrainian diaspora are often isolated and uninstitutionalized. Despite the existence of a legislative framework, the practical implementation of support for migrants in this direction is insufficient. Although the policy towards Ukrainians abroad is declared a component of Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy, real support for cultural and educational initiatives of the diaspora remains limited [45]	The PRC has established the Association for the Promotion of International Cultural Exchanges [46], which operates under the jurisdiction of the All-China Federation of Overseas Chinese. Its main goal is to consolidate compatriots and supporters of Chinese culture both in China and abroad, promote the spread of traditional Chinese culture, integrate world cultural experience, and implement international cultural exchange and cooperation. The activities of the Association are aimed at strengthening mutual understanding and developing friendly relations between the Chinese people and the peoples of different countries of the world. This organization plays a key role in shaping cultural dialogue between China and the international community, contributing to the preservation and popularization of Chinese culture, as well as the development of cultural ties on a global scale [46]
Charity and humanitarian aid	After the full-scale invasion, the main focus of the migration centers was and remains the support of Ukrainian refugees. Studies conducted in Poland and the Czech Republic show that the majority of Ukrainian migrants in these countries provided shelter to Ukrainian refugees. The Ukrainian diaspora also launched numerous online and offline communication activities to counter propaganda and disinformation from the Russian Federation. Humanitarian aid and charity were the first response of the Ukrainian diaspora [43]	Bilateral support for Chinese communities through a network of charities, museums, etc. [47]
Political relations		
Lobbying of interests	Limited influence, local initiatives in the US, Canada and EU	High level of political lobbying, especially in Southeast Asia
Participation in political processes	Diaspora efforts to shape policy and exert political influence in host countries took the form of civic activism only after the Orange Revolution and intensified most after the start of the full-scale invasion [43]	Active political participation through economic influence and diaspora organizations
Diplomatic cooperation	Lack of effective mechanisms for diaspora interaction with the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry	China maintains stable contact with the diaspora through embassies, business structures, and cultural organizations
Intellectual relations		
Exchange of knowledge and technologies	Lack of a state strategy for attracting Ukrainian specialists from abroad	The Chinese Entrepreneurship Alliance promotes knowledge exchange, innovation, and the development of high-tech entrepreneurship among overseas Chinese entrepreneurs. Its activities are aimed at consolidating the innovative and entrepreneurial potential of the Chinese diaspora in order to promote sustainable economic development and international cooperation

Thus, in Ukraine, unlike the PRC, socio-cultural relationships between the diaspora and the country of origin prevail. The latter indicates the formation of a cultural ethnic network, but by no means

an economic one. In the PRC, all types of ties with their migrants are developed – cultural, political, economic and intellectual, however, the dominant role belongs to the business component, which is confirmed

by the name of the network – Oversea Chinese Business Networks. That is why Chinese emigrants have become a factor in the economic development of the PRC. Thus, the formation of an economic ethnic network should take place comprehensively, systematically and in the future (strategically).

In Ukraine, there were certain attempts to cooperate with Ukrainian emigrants:

- the Ukrainian authorities began to develop a policy on the diaspora only after the Orange Revolution, when in 2004 the Law of Ukraine “On Overseas Ukrainians” was adopted [48];
- in 2021, the Ukrainian government prepared a draft Concept of the State Target Program for Cooperation with Ukrainians Abroad for the period until 2023 and the corresponding Action Plan, but these documents were never approved [49];
- in the “Recovery Plan for Ukraine”, presented by the National Recovery Council in 2022, the Ukrainian diaspora is mentioned mainly in the context of facilitating the return of Ukrainians to their homeland, and not as a key economic resource [50];
- in May 2022, the “Diia.Business” consulting center opened in Poland (Warsaw), which provides services for organizing and conducting entrepreneurial activities. The Center’s activities are also aimed at strengthening cooperation between entrepreneurs of both coun-

tries and strengthening bilateral trade relations [51]. This indicates that at the state level, they are beginning to think about forming economic ties with Ukrainian emigrants, which will further contribute to the creation of an economic ethnic network;

– in early January 2025, the President of Ukraine announced the creation of Unity Hub – a multifunctional space created to support Ukrainians abroad. Among the key functions are identified as providing cultural, educational, social and administrative support to the Ukrainian community, as well as facilitating the return of Ukrainians home. However, again, the financial and economic areas of the Unity Hub’s functioning that would contribute to the formation of an economic ethnic network are not highlighted.

This indicates the lack of a strategic approach to the formation of an economic ethnic network that could attract financial and investment opportunities from the diaspora. Currently, Ukraine is not sufficiently using the potential of its communities abroad for long-term economic development. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider the possibilities of forming a Ukrainian economic ethnic network at the current stage and in the post-war perspective (Table 3).

It is worth considering that as of March 2024, 65 % of migrants intended to return to the country, 59 % of whom in the future, and 6 % in the next 12 months [52].

Table 3

Possibilities for the formation of an economic ethnic network at the present stage and in the post-war perspective

Conditions for the formation of an ethnic network	At the present stage	After the end of hostilities and the return of some migrants to Ukraine
Creation of long-term, stable national centers within certain territorial or geographical boundaries through permanent emigration	The constant emigration of Ukrainians continues (according to the State Border Guard Service administration, 2.22 million people did not return in 2022, 0.14 million people in 2023, and 0.45 million people in 2024) [53]. The longer the military operations continue, the higher the probability of citizens with children under 18 going abroad. In some countries, migrants are settled in groups (small temporary centers are created), in others – they are settled in families, which accelerates assimilation	Some Ukrainian men will leave Ukraine to reunite with their families
Migration of low-skilled labor and labor with a high level of cultural, spiritual and/or educational development	In 2022, people with both high and low levels of educational and cultural development migrated	Some citizens (both with a high and low level of educational and cultural development) will return to Ukraine. The rest will remain in the country to which they migrated (this applies to those who have adapted to living in the country – learned the language, found a job, have a stable income). This mostly applies to people with a high and average level of educational and cultural development. People with low levels of development in the countries that received Ukrainian migrants will be interested in their return
Close ties with the mother state	Remaining because relatives remained in Ukraine (remittances from abroad continue to arrive)	Some will maintain such ties because relatives will remain in Ukraine
Absence of a dominant ideology and nationalist idea in the country receiving migrants	In some EU countries (Germany, Poland), an assimilation policy is being implemented: access to education and employment opportunities depend on the level of language proficiency. In general, the governments of EU countries are interested in Ukrainian migrants, since their presence allows them to solve the demographic problem of these countries	Some EU countries will be interested in Ukrainian migrants not returning to Ukraine, because this will significantly affect the demography of each of them, their labor markets, production volumes and economic growth [34]
Existence of economic (international trade, joint ventures, common currency) and political (diplomatic missions) ties between countries	Available	Available
Entrepreneurial abilities and entrepreneurial culture of migrants	Ukrainian migrants have developed entrepreneurial abilities and an entrepreneurial culture. This is confirmed by the data presented above (Fig. 3)	Entrepreneurship can be stimulated by low wages. For example, those people who have higher education and relevant work experience, but do not know the language at a certain level, will not be able to get a job in their specialty and will receive low income

So, at the present stage and in the future, there are all the prerequisites for the formation of a Ukrainian economic ethnic network. However, it is worth paying attention to the factors that restrain this process. In our opinion, these include:

- the policy of the country-recipient of migrants (in particular, the presence of a policy of assimilation of migrants complicates the processes of forming an ethnic network);
- the desire of emigrants to maintain ties with Ukraine (Ukrainian entrepreneurs, state structures, households);
- financial and economic cooperation with the diaspora at the state level.

Thus, an important role in the process of forming a Ukrainian economic ethnic network belongs to the state. It must maintain ties with Ukrainian migrants, stimulate them to cooperate with domestic economic entities, contribute to the preservation of their cultural and national identity, etc.

Practical significance. The results of the study may be interesting for countries with a high level of emigration, as they will allow analyzing the opportunities for these countries to form ethnic networks. The latter can become a significant factor in economic growth for donor countries.

At the same time, the results of the study may be interesting for identifying opportunities for involving Ukrainian migrants in the development of the domestic economy.

Research limitations. The results of the study have certain limitations, since when studying the problem of the “bamboo network” (ethnic network), the authors relied on the experience of only one country – the People’s Republic of China. That is why the study may not take into account the peculiarities of other countries and/or certain factors that influence the formation of the ethnic network. These may include religion or mentality.

The influence of martial law conditions. The full-scale war in Ukraine became the impetus for conducting the study, as it caused a forced wave of emigration of Ukrainians abroad, and migration processes are a stimulating factor in the formation of the Ukrainian ethnic network. The conditions of martial law also influenced the results of the study, in particular, the gender and age structure of migrants (since there are few men among Ukrainian migrants). This, in turn, partially affects the decision of Ukrainian migrants to return to their homeland and the stability of social ties.

Prospects for further research. The prospects of this study are to identify opportunities for involving Ukrainian migrants (primarily from economically developed countries) in the development of the domestic economy.

Since the formation of an ethnic network depends on social capital, further research will be aimed at developing measures for its formation between the donor country and the emigrant. We plan to determine the role of each of the economic entities in the formation of stable foreign economic relations in order to transform Ukrainian migrants into a significant factor in the development of the domestic economy.

The huge migration flow caused by the beginning of the war between Russia and Ukraine should be used to the maximum extent possible in the future for the development of our state. And, considering that a significant proportion of Ukrainians who emigrated will remain living abroad even after the end of the war, it forces us to look for the potential for the future post-war accelerated development and reconstruction of Ukraine. In our opinion, the huge potential lies precisely in building our own economic ethnic network.

4. Conclusions

The study shows that, despite the challenges faced by the donor country, the recipient country, and migrants during migration, migration can have positive consequences for the economy of the donor country. The example of the economy of the PRC demonstrates that these opportunities arise through the establishment of economic relation-

ships between economic entities of the donor country and emigrants, that is, through the formation of an ethnic network. In the process of the study, blocking factors for the formation of the Ukrainian ethnic network during each of the migration waves were identified, and the prospects for its formation in connection with forced migration during a full-scale war were also investigated.

The results of the study of the prospects for the formation of the Ukrainian ethnic network will be useful in developing economic policies aimed at restoring Ukraine in conditions of a significant reduction in the population. It is the ethnic network that can become one of the factors of economic growth in Ukraine.

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest in relation to this study, including financial, personal, authorship or other, which could affect the study and its results presented in this article.

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Data availability

The manuscript has no associated data.

Use of artificial intelligence

The authors confirm that they did not use artificial intelligence technologies in the creation of the presented work.

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