

ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND SOCIAL CRISES IN THE EMERGENCE OF CONTEMPORARY SALAFIST SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN MIDDLE EAST

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Abstract. What is the role of the intellectual foundations caused by social crisis in the emergence of contemporary Islamic Salafi movements in the Middle East? which thinkers in the history are considered as the founders of new Islamic Salafist in the Middle East; moreover the thoughts of these thinkers were born from which crisis and social relations? Analysis of this phenomenon based on pure religious teachings is in vain; therefore, our method in this article in addition to referring to the most important thinking dimensions of influential thinkers in the emergence of contemporary Islamic Salafi in the Middle East, was to analyze and explain the effective social crisis in the above phenomenon. In this article, the role of crises such as the succession crisis of the Prophet Muhammad, the collapse of the Abbasid caliphate, the Mongol invasion, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the First World War, the colonial constitution, the relations of the colonial states and ... had been shown in the creation of these movements, and finally, it had been concluded that the radical and controversial thoughts of contemporary Islamic Salafi and Takfiri movements have been caused by radical and controversial social conditions and crises.

Key words: Salafism, Salafist Movements, Social Crises, Takfirism, Wahhabism.

Introduction and Problem Statement. The extraordinary expansion of Salafist Islamic social currents and movements since the late 1970s onwards in Middle East and across the world is indeed the objective outcome of the vicissitudinous history of intellectual and social developments in Islamic world from its dawn. History of Islam has been witness to movements that have emerged from the heart of sociological crises some of which have been born dead while others continued their lives throughout the history after laying down the groundwork of their intellectual and social lineage. One of the striking features of most Islamic movements is their circularity. To put it otherwise, these movements undergo through consecutive periods of stagnation and resurrection. In fact, one can argue that in the course of Islamic history the occurrence of Islamic uprisings and movements has been restricted to great chaos and diversity eras, i.e. those eras in which the existence, spiritual and identity consistency of Islamic world were exposed to tension and threat. If we want to provide a chronological periodization of the history of Islamic social movements since the dawn of Islam until now we can do it as follows:

Islam Prophet's Ummah: the movement and society, the structures of which were founded by the Prophet based on divine revelation and in the form of Islamic Sharia can be declared as the first and purest Islamic movement. This movement emerged in response to the crisis of Bedouin Arab ignorance in Arabian Peninsula rather in the whole world. The measure and scale of purity of this movement were clearly based on revealed teachings and Prophet's words and deeds. These teachings came to be known after Prophet's as "Quran" or "Mus'haf" while prophetic deeds and words were categorized as "Sunnah" and "Al-sīra") tradition and way of life(.

Succession Crisis (632-661 AD.): After the decease of the Islam Prophet, the social crisis that immediately engulfed Islamic society was the succession crisis. This crisis set the scene for the emergence of discord and disunion in the body of united Islamic nation. The caliphate of Abu Bakr and Omar relatively controlled and managed the crisis; but after the beginning of the caliphate of the Third Caliph, the ground was paved for the foundation of first period of theclannish caliphate of Umayyad.

Rise and Fall of Umayyad Caliphate (661-750 AD.): The majority of Muslims, particularly Shia Muslims, never tolerated the legitimacy of Umayyad caliphate and considered it a huge deviance from the movement of Prophet Muhammad. The first reaction to the political, social and ethical decadence of Umayyad caliphate after Husayn ibn Ali Movement can be seen in the approach adopted by Omar Ibn Abdul-Aziz. When he undertook the leadership of Islamic society he decided to act as a reformist and ground the bases of a reformist movement that aims at clearing the dust of the utter intellectual and social deviance and eradicating the dominant spirit of bigotry, haughtiness and Ashaarism of Umayyad generation. His intellectual heritage continued its life in the form of social movements led by Abu Hanifah (founder of Hanafi School), and Malek Ibn Anas both of whom played the role of a "reformer".

Rise and Fall of Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258 AD.): In 750 AD. another social crisis engulfed Islamic world from which a social revolutionary movement emerged under the leadership of Abu al-Abbas that finally led to the formation of Abbasid Caliphate. Ibn Hanbal is declared the first Imam and supporter of Sunni fundamentalism. Hanbali jurisprudential school that was a type of resistance/reaction to the Inquisition Tribunal of Muqtazila in Abbasid era is considered to be the basis of Wahhabi fundamentalism in contemporary era (official ideology of the Kings of Saudi Arabia) (Dekmejian, 2011: 43-44). This is the same ideology and thought that was revived later in Islamic world by Ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab, and Rashid Reza as a response to the dominant social crises. The

fall of Abbasid Caliphate following the Mongol invasion brought about a huge crisis in Islamic world; this was the crisis from the heart of which a radical aggressive social movement emerged, which was led by IbnTaymiyyah.

Ottoman Caliphate (1299-1922 AD.): After the fall of Abbasid caliphate a kind of power transition from Arabs to Turks occurred in the form of Ottoman Empire. However, even this caliphate faced a challenge in the late 19th and early 20th centuries that Bernard Lewis calls “challenge of modernity”. It was indeed this challenge that finally eliminated Ottoman Empire from international scene in 1922 and caused the affairs of Middle East to be undertaken by western states that turned the region into a ground for imperialistic competitions (Lewis, 2014: 355). Three revivalist social movements of Wahhabism, Mahdism and Senussi emerged in later Ottoman era, the most expansive and influential one of which was the Wahhabi Monotheists Movement led by Muhammad Ibn Abdu al-Wahhab.

Fall of Ottoman Empire: WWI, Sykes–Picot Agreement and Belfour Declaration, and finally the fall of Ottoman Empire caused serious damages to the pride, identity and collective conscience of the majority of Muslim societies in the Middle East. The fall of Ottoman Empire in its confrontation with European Imperialism triggered a set of reformist reactions/movements in nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The chief motivation behind these reformist and moderate intellectual movements can be sought for in the ideas of Seyyed Jamal al-Din Asadabadi and Muhammad Abduh who were the pioneers of universal Islamic union and resistance before European imperialism through a kind of returning to an Islam that is more coherent with the features of modern world (Hatami and Bahrani, 2013: 100-101). But after them, Rashid Reza who was after the revival of caliphate system revised the whole ideas in this regard and supported the revivalist social movement of Wahhabism.

Muslim Brotherhood and Neo-Salafism (contemporary era, since 1928 until now): During mid-1930s Rashid Reza’s moderate activism was replaced with radical social movement of “Muslim Brotherhood” led by Hassan al-Banna (the pupil of Rashid Reza). In this era when social crises, resulting from political turmoil, improper leadership, social and economic conflict, European imperialism and the clash between Islam and the newly emerged western concept had overshadowed the whole Islamic world, the emergence of an alternative radical Islamism that was based on the inherited ideas of previous reformists seemed unavoidable (Dekmejian, 2011: 49). In its beginning, this movement appeared relatively intelligible and logical but following the developments of 1970s and after the death of Jamal Abdu al-Nasir and also due to the exclusivist and authoritarian policies of nationalist, socialist and secular states in Middle East before the Salafist social movements that sought to take part in political affairs, the movements motivated by Muslim Brotherhood turned radical. The new Salafist social movements (that through a huge epistemological interruption have undergone a significant intellectual turn to the ideas of IbnTaymiyyah, Muhammad Ibn Abdu al-Wahhab, and in contemporary era and based on the thoughts of these two thinkers, to such figures as Abdullah ‘Ezam, Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, Abu Muhammad al-Muqadasi, Abu BakrNaji, Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir al-Misri, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and so on and so forth) are the outcomes of the conflicts and various interpretations of the ideas of the forefathers of Salafism that have created different structures within miscellaneous social crises.

The main problem of this research (that represents its necessity and importance) is synthetic and dialectical description and analysis of the most significant intellectual and social factors of the emergence and rise of Salafist social movements in Middle East in an intellectual and sociological context. In other words, the current study seeks to explain the intellectual and social bases of contemporary Salafism and consequently its impact on the emergence of Salafi fundamental and terrorist social movements (like Al-Qaeda and ISIS) that spread terror under the banner of Islam.

Research Objectives and Questions. Every scientific research contains certain objectives and primary and secondary questions that have to be answered. The questions of this research are also of two, primary and secondary types. The primary question of this research is: Which social and intellectual crises in the past and present times have led to the emergence of contemporary Salafist social movements? The secondary questions of this paper are as follows: 1- What are the intellectual principles of Salafism? Who are the forefathers of contemporary Salafism? 2- What is the role of social crises and the relations of Western world with Islamic world in the rise of contemporary Takfirist and Salafist social movements as well as in the promotion of aggression and terror?

Research Background. Numerous works, theses and papers have been authored independently regarding intellectual and social principles of Salafism, some of which can be reviewed here by the authors as follows:

1- Political Sociology of Social Movements (2011), Hamid Ahmadi, Imam Sadeq University Press, particularly the discussion on Islamism and the issue of violence. 2- Religious Violence under the Banner of Textualism (Puritanism) in Islam and Christianity; focusing on Islamic Salafism and Christian Fundamentalism (2015), Ruhullah Shahamat Dehsorkhi and Seyed Ali Hassani, Journal of Knowledge of Religions. 3- Political Movements of Middle East: From Salafism to Neo-Salafism (2013), Hojatollah Judaki et al., Month Book of History and Geography. 4- Outcome of Al-Qaeda’s Salafism in Islamic World (2006), Hamid Reza Esmaeili, Strategic Studies of Islamic World. 5- Power and Violence in Political Islam (2010), Arash Raeisinezhad, MA Thesis, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Tehran University. 6- Ideological Roots of Terrorism: Focusing on the Ideology of Al-Qaeda as a Case Study (2009), Azar Alinezhad, MA Thesis, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Tehran University. 7- US Foreign Policy and Expansion of Islamic Neo-Fundamentalism after 1990s (2007), Muhammad Sadeq Jokar, MA Thesis, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Tehran University. 8- Critical Study of Salafist Ideas of Monotheism and Prophecy (2003), Ali Allah Behashti, Ph.D. Thesis, Faculty of Theology, Tehran University. The general

approach of the aforementioned books, theses and papers can be divided into three classes: 1- Some of them have dealt merely with intellectual principles of Islamic fundamentalism and Salafism. 2- Some have only assayed this issue from a political point of view. 3- Some have comparatively studied the relationship between Islam, Islamic fundamentalism and the notion of “violence” as a whole. Moreover, the cited works are restricted to jurisprudence, theology, scholastic discourse and political sciences and have not entered the domain of sociology and social sciences. What distinguishes this paper from other books, theses and papers and adds to its significance is the reduction, definition and appropriation of the subject and the excavation of intellectual and social foundations of the emergence of Salafist social movements in an eclectic and synthetic manner. Of course, it is far too clear that the content of the current paper may have certain overlaps with other important studies in some details though the total essence of the article with respect to its subject-matter and method is distinguished.

Theoretical Considerations. If social movements can be considered organizations that have been constituted to defend, expand and achieve particular goals that are essentially actionalistic; (Rocher, 2008: 129-132) no doubt, contemporary Salafist movements can be included among them. Social movements that are one of the most powerful and influential forms of collective action in social dimensions (Giddens and Birdsall, 2011: 635) not only play a vital role in political sociology but are also heavily engaged in definition of notions and concepts, evolution of identities and individual life style and are analyzed in political sociology in this way. Moreover, they make cultural politics focused on “social change” as the core of social interests. (Nash, 2015: 129-130) This is why the significance of sociological analysis of their emergence in the context of society and social crises doubles. Social crises, according to the suggested definition, are particular social and psychological pressures that lead to the collapse of the common systems and notions of life and social reactions. In other words, the emergence of these crises is the result of occurrence of lack of unity and consequently inability of political and social system in organizing social order and tackling disorders that poses threats to general balance and normal function of social, political and cultural life (Waezi, 2011: 30-33). The rise of contemporary Takfirist and Salafist social movements under the banner of the concept of political Islam is also the legitimate son of crises, i.e. social, political, military, and cultural crises that have continuously led to the continuous emergence of revolutionary uprisings in consecutive Muslim generations and have made them to reclaim their identity through revolutionary actions. Hrair Dekmejian believes in “circular or epochal model” in this regard, according to which radical movements emerge and fall in social and political contexts: “in fact, there is a causal relationship between spiritual, social and political chaos and the rise of fundamentalist movements” (Dekmejian, 2011: 36). Indeed, in his circular and dialectical model, crises play a significant role in the emergence of ideas and movements. According to Dekmejian, Islamic social movements are not new phenomena, rather they are merely contemporary manifestations of historical streams that have emerged during the post-Islamic era in various parts of Islamic world (Hatami and Bahrani, 2013: 1/28). New Takfirist and Salafist social movements are not exceptions in this regard and in the words of Giddens, their analysis based on mere intellectual and religious teachings will be defected (Giddens and Birdsall, 2011: 815). In the present research, we have sought to analyze contemporary Salafist movements in Middle East that have taken form at the heart of social crises relying on the epochal theory presented by Dekmejian after providing an account of the most significant intellectual principles of Salafist theoreticians and thinkers (who were themselves the products of social crises). In other words, in this research the intellectual contexts and social crises (particularly in modern times) and the quality of their impact on the emergence of contemporary Takfirist and Salafist social movements in Middle East are excavated.

Methodology and Research Technique. The methodology and research technique that we have chosen in this study based on its conceptual framework for data collection is the library based and documentary method, and since in this research method, depiction of goals, nature and research problem is the light that guides us towards the purposeful, concentrated and condensed study, we have tried to first discuss the key terms used in the research through a comprehensive survey of the existing literature in all available formats including intellectual and sociological works that are directly or indirectly related with the final goals of the research in the form of note taking, translation, summary, articulation and sociological analysis. It is needless to say that first hand references (including Persian, Arabic and English works) were of priority as compared to secondary written or unwritten documents due to their authority, validity, clarity and meaning. It is noteworthy that in the course of research we shall first turn to intellectual genealogy of Salafist movements and explain their intellectual principles and foundations based on the effective ideas of individuals who have played an indispensable role in their evolution and then at the final stage we shall provide an analysis of the role of social crises in the emergence of contemporary Takfirist and Salafist movements in Middle East through a sociological perspective concomitant with theoretical considerations of the research.

Research Findings. In this research the intellectual principles of forefathers of Salafist movements (despite their deep differences in some cases), their influence on next generations, and the role of social crises and contexts in the emergence of contemporary Takfirist and Salafist movements are consecutively assayed and the findings are presented.

Intellectual Genealogy of Salafist Movements. Contemporary Salafism or Neo-Salafism is the product of the vicissitudinous history of intellectual disputes of scholars, jurists and thinkers who have emerged in the form of various sects and schools in the context of particular social conditions in every era and exist in the current status. Reducing all existing attitudes in the Salafism to one unique attitude and restricting it to a specified era is resulted from a type of essentialistic shallow-mindedness that the hidden dogmatism embedded in it closes the path to every deep excavation; in other words, Salafism is not a unique phenomenon rather it has been understood in different terms

and this is why we have used the word “movements” instead of “movement. Our discussion of Salafism in this paper is not theological nor jurisprudential or scholastic rather its genealogy is socially grounded and we seek to understand it as a dynamic phenomenon in the course of its developments in history; it has its particular context and time and is essentially historical and reveals its historicity through its various forms. The term *Salaf* that first seems to be referring to the past, reactionary and old-fashioned mindset is in one sense (lexical sense) the equivalent of present time and in one other sense (terminological sense) its opposite. In both cases the modern and future seeking mind struggles to know the reason and quality of the return. Why? To what? And how? All three questions have revealed right and wrong consequences in the history of this movement that even now continue to emerge. Basically when we excavate the implication of Salafism (in its all forms and branches) and consider it, we come across in it/ them a kind of old and deep “dissatisfaction” from the status quo and whatever exists in it. Salafism (that not only is not restricted to Islam and one can trace its footprints in various branches of Christianity, Judaism and even Buddhism and other non-revealed or irreligious schools too) accuses the present time with all its prevailing conditions and relations of deviation and considers it to be reproachable accordingly and believes that the path of deliverance lies in returning to the golden age of the majesty of Islamic movement. In Islamic Salafism the golden age refers to the era which was founded by Prophet Muhammad and completed by his disciples; the era in which there was no sign of Bid‘ah (innovation) and Sharia (Islamic law) of Allah was the source of the actions of servants and the rules of social relations. This golden age was an era under the shadow of which the Bedouin Arab of Jahiliyyah era (Pre-Islamic period) inherited the rule of a large part of the world within less than a century. Finally, one needs to note that the age of “al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ” (righteous ancestor) refers to the age of Islam Prophet, his Sahabah (disciples), the Tabi‘un (disciples’ followers) and the Tabi‘ al-Tabi‘in (followers of the followers). All thinkers, leaders and followers of Salafism (even if they refuse to call themselves so) from IbnTaymiyyah to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (regardless of the nature of their ideas and actions) at least verbally believe in the necessity of returning to Quran, prophetic tradition and to the righteous ancestor. Here we seek to explain the significant intellectual principles of social movements related to Salafism that have had a vital role in their objective embodiment:

Undoubtedly, IbnTaymiyyah is one of the pioneers of Salafist movement and after Ibn Hanbal (the founder of school of traditionalism) he is the most outstanding harbinger of neo-Salafism, and his followers called him “Sheikh al-Islam”. He raised the banner of Salafism while Asha’rites and traditionalists were in conflict and allegedly struggled to follow “the people of tradition and community” who lived in the first three centuries (11-300 of AH.). He dogmatically and exclusively denied other jurisprudential schools except the Hanbali school⁴ and considered every juristic judgement a “heresy” and was against Shia rituals of eulogy, resorting and pilgrimage. He issued a decree of Jihad against Mongols, Ismailia, Alavis and Druze. He argued that this jihad is more obligatory than prayer and fasting. (Dekmejian, 2011: 79-80). He wrote *Minhaj al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyah fi Naqz al-Kalam al-Shia al-Qadariainin* response to AllamaHelli’s *Minhaj al-Kiramah fi Marifat al-Emam* that contains arguments against Shiism. The major themes of this book (that is of a special place even in modern Takfirist and Salafist currents and justifies their violence against Shia) can be outlined as follows: 1- Imamah is not one of the articles of faith, 2- denial of Mahdism (in Shia belief), 3- denial of divine vicegerency of Imam Ali and enumeration of the wrong consequences of this belief in Shiism, 4- denial of perfect knowledge and perfection of Prophet’s Household: he believed that Oza’eiShafe’i and IbnHanbal are more knowledgeable than their contemporary Shia Imams, i.e. Musa IbnJafar, Ali Ibn Musa and Muhammad Ibn Ali, 5- criticism of the immaculacy of Prophet’s Household: this criticism has been voiced in the treatise of *Allah Allah fi Ashabi*: “people of Sunnah and Muslim community and religious leaders believe that no one of the disciples, or relatives of the Prophet, or those who are religiously righteous or the rest of believers are immaculate” (IbnTaymiyyah, 2016: 15). 6- Criticism of the ignorance and superstitions of Shia (‘Enayat, 2013: 71-74). In the introduction of his work *MukhtasarMinhaj al-Sunnah* he calls the Shia Muslims liars:

“Apostates are the biggest liars of the world... there is no doubt that the issues that are raised by such ignorant men as Tusi and Mofid as regards visiting tombs are all baseless and a lie. The lies that I have seen in Shia works I do not expect to see even in Christian and Jewish books” (IbnTaymiyyah, 2007: 20).

He continues in the following words:

“I swear to God that my studies have not shown any man who believes in Shiism and is at the same time a good man in public eyes, let alone those who believe Imamism from the bottom of their hearts.” (ibid: 23).

These stances about Shia Muslims in his works have had destructive effect on Salafist currents in the course of history and contemporary era and triggered hostile conflicts between Shia and Sunni and have been one of the factors involved in the promotion of political violence. Moreover, he considers reason, philosophy and Sufism a type of heresy. (Ebrahimi, 2015: 184). IbnTaymiyyah’s works had a visible and deep influence on the thoughts and works of Rashid Reza (to whom we will turn in upcoming discussions) the Syrian pupil of Muhammad Abduh and the founder of *Al-Minar Journal* (which played an indispensable role in the expansion of the ideas of IbnTaymiyyah in North Africa) in

⁴Hanbalism is one of the four major denominations of Sunnism the followers of which follow Ahmad IbnHanbal (164 AH.). Hanbalists are traditionalist and strongly insist on the surface meaning of traditions and verses. They believe that nine things result in apostasy: 1- denial of divinity of God, 2- polytheism, 3- denial of one of divine attributes, 4- denial of prophecy, 5- insulting God and the Prophet, 6- leaving or denial of one quintuple worships (prayer, fasting, Hajj, alms, jihad) based on consciousness or enmity, 7- denial of prohibitions, 8- claim of prophecy, 9- affirmation of the claimer of prophecy (Velaie, 2014: 68).

1897. Some streaks of his thought can be found in the ideas of Abu al-‘Ala Maududi and Syed Qutb (of course with some fundamental differences), Shukri Mustafa, ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj and Jahiman al-‘Atibi. (Dekmejian, 2011: 82) Among his works *Al-Syasa al-Shar‘yah fi Eslah al-Ra‘eiva al-Ra‘yah* has been most influential on contemporary Salafist thinkers. After him until the emergence of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, his pupils like Zahabi, Ibn Qayyim, and Ibn Kathir almost failed to promote his ideas.

Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab is the true immediate successor of Ibn Taymiyyah who, after four centuries rose from Najd of Hijaz and struggled to revive the Hanbali school based on a reading of Ibn Taymiyyah. ‘Abd al-Wahhab had the social and political support that Ibn Taymiyyah couldn’t have due to the domination of Mongols. The full support of Muhammad Ibn Saud⁵ of him that led to the establishment of a government in Dar‘ayah city at Najd tied political power to Salafist Ideology and provided him with a huge power for promotion and expansion of his ideas. He did not avoid using any form of violence and bigotry for eradication of heresy and apostasy from Islamic world. He considered the beliefs of other Muslims in his time the clear extensions of heresy and apostasy and was against the superficial quotation of Quranic verses and traditions under the name of pure Islamic monotheism like: using amulet, frequent visits of tombs, keeping away from material world and resorting to entities apart from Allah and so on and so forth (‘Enayat, 1991: 6 cf. Seqaf, 2008: 62-63). In his interpretation of monotheism and the meaning of *There is no God but Allah* he refers to the verse 57 of chapter Asra’, verses 26 and 27 of chapter Zukhruf, verse 31 of chapter Tubah, verse 165 of chapter Baqara and writes (on loving someone but Allah):

“Those who love both God and fake beloveds they are not true believers and can never be declared Muslims and will end up in the hell” (‘Abd al-Wahhab, 2010: 34).

‘Abd al-Wahhab refers to a prophetic tradition quoted from *Sahih-e-Muslim* and argues that mere declaration of divine oneness is not enough and true monotheism requires the believers to excommunicate the fake beloveds otherwise he will not be a Muslim and his property and life can be taken (ibid: 35). This intellectual movement after many ups and downs succeeded to prevail in Najd, Hijaz and other parts of Arabian Peninsula and finally Saudi Arabian government was established. One can state that Wahhabis (the title that is given by the opponents of the ideas of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab to his followers) started the greatest and most severe superficial and dogmatic conflict with Shiism that was unprecedented in Islamic history. Their excessive violence and fundamentalism in excommunication and declaring other Islamic denominations (except Hanbalism) apostates and destruction of sacred places of the Shia and their humiliation despite their being a minority caused irreparable damages to the body of Islamic nation that still stands (‘Enayat, 2013: 80).

The intellectual principles of Rashid Reza had a significant role in the emergence of Salafist social movements. Rashid Reza was a Syrian national and was chosen in 1920 as the chancellor of Syrian national council in Damascus. He was one of the outstanding pupils and followers of Muhammad Abduh and the founder of *Al-Minar* Journal in which he published his own particular Islamic teachings for thirty five years. Although in many respects he continued the modernist and revivalist movement defended by Muhammad Abduh, he still had different ideas in some cases (however few in number and deep in content) including: caliphatism, tribalism, enmity with Sufism and Shiism. He sought to make more use of Textualism and excessive traditionalism in interpretation of the verses of Quran in order to continue and complement *Al-Minar*. He believed in the revival of caliphate based on the prophetic teachings. Rashid Reza considered caliphate the manifestation of continuity and integrity of religion and state and the objective realization of Islamic Sharia in modern world and in this path he sought to take the caliphate back from Turks and bring it to the representatives of people. Rashid Reza contends that a Caliph should be pious, courageous, healthy, rational, and jurisprudentially competent and of course Arab and from Quraysh but if someone usurps the caliphate to overcome the chaos in Muslim community his action is legitimate rather it is necessary (‘Enayat, 1991: 156-159). In a book entitled *Al-Sunnah wa al-Shia aw al-Wahhabiyya al-Rafizyah* Rashid Reza claims that he is continuing the path of Seyed Jamal in integrating all Islamic denominations and acquiring unity in Islamic world. He openly insults Shiism and argues that they are apostates whose beliefs are contaminated with heresies and distort Quran (Rashid Reza, 1947: 12-14). It is perhaps for this reason that Shahid Motaharic considers him to be a partial fanatic who is the follower of Ibn Taymiyyah and ‘Abd al-Wahhab and has deviated the religious reform movement. In this regard, he writes:

“Some of them [the proponents of reform in Islamic world] due to a number of deviations, instead of making reforms, have paved the path for corruption and thus they are corrupts and not reformists. Seyed Muhammad Rashid Reza is one of these corrupts. Rashid Reza pretended more and more to be a reformist and presented himself as the follower of Seyed Jamal and Abduh but since he was indeed motivated by the ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab instead of Seyed Jamal and Abduh, he was more a proponent of Wahhabism than a Muslim reformist. His partial comments particularly concerning Shia show that he is not competent to be a reformist. First condition of reformism is one’s being delivered from the bondages of excessive bigotries in favor of a special sect or against other sect that was absent in Rashid Reza.

⁵Muhammad Ibn Saud considered Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab an individual who could overcome the rival Sheikhs in Arabia under the banner of “Islamic Jihad” and through the slogan of “returning to the righteous ancestor”. In other words, ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s invitation to Sword Jihad provided an opportunity for Ibn Saud to guarantee his comprehensive domination over the political arena of Arabia (Hause, 2015: 20).

I wish Rashid Reza could purify his mind of ignorant bigotries at least as much as his master Muhammad Abduh” (Motahari, 1989: 45-46).

Rashid Reza was adamant in promoting Arabism, caliphate (Islamic State) as well as in opposing Shiism to the extent that he appears more as a fanatic Wahhabi thinker. His discourse of caliphatism (features that he enumerates for Islamic State) is now the inseparable facet and rather the central core of political thought of contemporary Salafist jihadi thinkers and jurists. His influence on the thoughts of Hassan al-Banna (of course with differences) and subsequently the evolution of Muslim Brotherhood Organization amid numerous social crises that engulfed the Islamic World are undeniably important and should be taken into account. Following the fall of Ottoman Empire in 1922 and the annulment of Islamic Caliphate in 1924 based on the decree issued by Turkey’s Great National Assembly, Islamic World underwent an intellectual disintegration and metamorphosis. It seemed that upon the emergence of a strong wave of “modernity” in the age of modern nation-states which were so eagerly desired by Ataturk and endorsed by Iqbal Lahori (‘Enayat, 2013: 114). There is no for what was declared by Rashid Reza as the necessity of caliphate exist, thus in his later theoretical model he introduced Islamic State as an alternative for caliphate system. The impact of his thought on Hassan al-Banna played an important role in the evolution of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Due to social and political conditions of the chaotic atmosphere after WWI which was associated with the instigation of public emotions in Egypt following the 1919 revolution against UK, fall of Ottoman caliphate, prevalence of atheism among intellectuals and university graduates, expansion of the political and philosophical secularism by Ataturk and so on and so forth, Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hassan Al-Banna in 1928. It was, on the one hand, after the jurisdiction of Islamic teachings in social and political life of Egypt, and on the other hand, this movement sought to realize the unity of Arab world and purifying Islamic communities from colonialism. These efforts led to the export of this movement to Syria and the establishment of the Association of Young Parties in 1948 (‘Enayat, 1991: 240-241). Hassan al-Banna (pupil of Rashid Reza) sought to actualize the dreams of Seyed Jamal for founding a revolutionary Islamic party. He considered himself a member of Rashid Reza’s family and tried to establish a concentrated Islamic state (Ebrahimi, 2015: 180-181). He offered a model for promotion of Muslim Brotherhood's ideology which was based on three basic foundations: Islam is a comprehensive and evolving school that has determined the final borders of life in all respects, Islam has been founded on two basic pillars of Quran and tradition and Islam is of a function that is valid in all times and places. Hassan al-Banna was a professional organizer and created an organization that had more than one million followers and members. In 1949 Nokrashy Pashahe was assassinated and Hassan al-Hazibi succeeded him. Syed Qutb who lived in the US then was witness to the happiness of Americans upon hearing the news of his assassination and was greatly impressed. Following the revolution/coup of Free Egypt officers in 1952 under the leadership of Muhammad Najeeb and Jamal Abd al-Naseer (that resulted in the overthrow of Malik Faruq) the basis of disagreement between Brotherhood and Naseer was laid, insofar as after his assassination attempt in 1954, a large numbers of Brotherhood followers were arrested. The key disagreement of Brotherhood and Naseer lied in the Islamist demands of Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of Syed Qutb and nationalist pan-Arabic policies of Naseer. Following the intensification of these discords a new wave of arrests started in 1965 that led to the execution of Syed Qutb in 1966; an execution that one can feasibly say was the last nail on the coffin of Naseerism. On the other hand, the tortures of Naseerian regime led to the radicalization of the members of the second generation of Brotherhood and finally Naseer’s defeat before Israel in 1967 broke the grandeur of his nationalistic and socialistic ideology in the Arab world and resulted in Islamization of Arab societies following his death in 1970 (Dekmejian, 2011: 149-157). Of course, Anwar Sadat’s policy of leaving Naseer’s legacy behind played a significant role in the emergence of an ideological gap in Egypt that was filled by violence and radicalism of the second generation of Brotherhood, the same generation that in 1981 assassinated him in the age of triple Jihadi movements⁶. From the beginning of 1990s and after the death of Naseer, political Islam presented itself as a supreme signifier, the signifier that not only was not a regressive and defensive reaction, rather as a political and social alternative, it offered new aspirations and goals regarding the development and evolution of Middle East and its deliverance from the chaotic situation and retrieval of Islamic majesty under the banner of Salafism (Esposito and Voll, 2014: 23-24). All aforementioned individuals and currents can be called the first generation of Salafism who are the inspirational sources of the radicalized Takfirist and Salafist generations after 1970s (to whom we will allude to in the coming section titled; Crises and Answers). These intellectual movements and individuals share four beliefs despite their differences: 1- commitment to revival of nation and purification of Muslim creed from superstitions and heresies through returning to Islamic roots (Salafism): Quran, Sunnah, past tradition, followers, followers’ followers, Messenger of Allah’s community;⁷ 2- supporting conflict and Jihad in defense of Islam; 3- synthesis of fundamental ideology with social and political activity in personal life; 4-

⁶ It refers to the organizations *Al-Tahrir al-Islami*, *Al-Takfirva al-Hijra* and *Al-Jihad* all of which emerged out of the crises of 1970s in Egypt.

⁷ Besides the denial of superficial reading of sacred scripture, one of the key differences of Shiism and aforementioned currents is the belief in non-authority of disciples and their quoted traditions (except those cases that are matched with Quran) (Tabatabaei, 1977: 46).

preparedness for confrontation with religious and political domination and the interest in self-sacrifice for Islam (Dekmejian, 2011: 82-83; cf. Movathaqi, 2014: 123-126).⁸

2- Crises and Responses: Role of Social Crises in the Emergence of Contemporary Takfirist and Salafist Movements:

Previous parts sought to explain the intellectual foundations of Salafist movements. Now this part is an effort to provide an analysis of role of contemporary social crises in the emergence of contemporary Takfirist and Salafist movements relying on the discussions raised in previous parts regarding the theoretical framework based on the “circular theory” of Harair Dekmejian.

2-1- Triple Generations: From Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation) in Egypt to Al-Dawlat al-Islami (Islamic State) in Iraq

Following the outbreak of WWI, which is considered by Bernard Lewis to be: “the climax of Islam’s retreat before the advancement of West” (Lewis, 2014: 354), balkanization of Middle East region, the ratification of Sykes-Picot Agreement by UK and France in 1916, recognition of Balfour Declaration by Britain on November 1917 (according to which Jews have the right to found a national territory for themselves), and finally the fall of Ottoman Empire as the last Islamic political system based on caliphate discourse in 1922 (which had survived for six centuries in the Mediterranean region and for four centuries in the Middle East) undermined the foundations of the old and relatively legitimate and accepted the order of the Islamic World. This disintegration led to the emergence of an epistemological sinkhole on the vicissitudinous scene of ideological conflicts in response to which three “secular”, “nationalist” and “Islamist” social movements emerged. Upon the failure of Secular movement to fulfill the goal of Kamalist policies, Gamal Abdel Naseer’s nationalism and ethnicism turned to the point on which Arab World relied. Soon the incorrect policies of Naseer concerning Muslim Brotherhood as well as his notorious defeat from Israel in the Six-Day War in 1967 broke his dominance and once again despondence and despair prevailed in the spirit of Arabs. One may say that after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Nasserism’s failure in 1970 was the greatest social crisis in Middle East, a crisis that was exacerbated first by the invasion of USSR in Afghanistan (that turned the country to a stronghold of Muslim hardliners and Takfirists and Salafists) amid Cold War and thereafter with post 9/11 US attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq. After Naseer’s death in 1970 three movements took form:

- 1- Islamic Liberation Organization (Al-Tahrir al-Islami) led by Saleh Saryeh,
- 2- Excommunication and Immigration (Jamiat al-Muslimin) led by Shukri Mustafa, and
- 3- Jihad Organization under the ideological leadership of Abd al-Salam Faraj – all of which were in some way inspired by Muslim Brotherhood in general and by Syed Qutb in particular (of course we should not ignore their fundamental differences). The first two movements were eradicated respectively in 1976 and 1978; but Jihad Organization (that assassinated Anwar Sadat through Khaled Islambouli in 1981) that remerged in late 1980s in “Egyptian Islamic Jihad” organization under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri (the current leader of al-Qaeda) continued to exist thanks to its special features and left more effective traces on its followers. Some of these features consisted of:

- 1- powerful organization, 2- belief in permeation into all government elements and presence in society, 3- belief in consultative and collective leadership, 4- organizational structure, power separation, spiritual leadership (Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman) 5- democratic centralism (Dekmejian, 2011: 173-177). Ideological leadership of this organization based on the teachings of Muhammad Abd-al-Salam Faraj (intellectual father of al-Qaeda) was founded in *Al-Farida al-gha'iba (The Neglected Duty)*. These teachings added Jihad (armed confrontation) as the Sixth Article to the Quintuple Islamic Articles of Faith. Thus this article of faith not only was declared necessary for the establishment of Islamic State and revival of Caliphate but anyone who breached it should have been considered an infidel (Faraj, 1981: 3-5). Some of these teachings are: true Muslims should declare Jihad on the leaders of the West and the East and this is obligatory for them though it has been forgotten, and the superficial Muslim leaders who do not act according to Islam are apostates. “Those who rule not based on Divine Revelation are surely apostates”. Death is the penalty of such rulers and cooperation with them is a sin. Continuous Jihad against the rule of infidels is the highest and noblest tasks of true Muslims. Armed Jihad is the only acceptable form of Jihad and so on and so forth (Dekmejian, 2011: 179-181; also cf. Faraj, 1981: 6-8). All the aforementioned organizations (despite their deep ideological differences) can be declared among the first generation of contemporary Takfirist Salafist movements after 1970s. Most of these Salafist movements survived until the early 1980s; but Jihad Organization continued its activity even after the execution of Abd al-Salam Faraj. This movement experienced its turning point in USSR vs. Afghanistan war and finally in the formation of Al-Qaeda in 1988. The chief reason for the formation of Al-Qaeda and promotion of Ladenism should be sought for in the military intervention of USSR in Afghanistan and then (as it has been mentioned by Bin Laden himself) the presence of Americans in Saudi Arabia (that is a symbol of sacrilege to Muslim Holy Land) amid Gulf War as well as the use of Saudi Arabia as a means for invasion of Iraq (Lewis, 2015: 146). Immigration and the escape of some members of the aforementioned organizations (Al-Tahrir al-Islami, Al-

⁸ It is needless to say that enumeration of all effective figures in Salafism discourse as well as detailed explanation of their ideas were not within the scope of the current essay. Thus we suffice to this amount of discussion. Moreover, we will discuss the contemporary Salafist figures, ideas, and movements, i.e. from 1970s onward (who have experience greater paradigmatic turns as compared to their predecessors) because they have close relationship with social and political crises and challenges.

Takfir, Al-Hijra and Al-Jihad) to Saudi Arabia led to a huge paradigmatic turn in the mind and soul of the totality of them. This turn paved the ground for the interpretation of political semi-Jihadism of Qutbism against the colonial domination in the context of Takfirist ideology of Salafist Wahhabism that had been forgotten under the shadow of “unity of graves” and “unity of defects”. It was this great transformation that led to the foundation of Peshawar Al-Qaeda and the emergence of neo-Salafist Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Anyway, such Jihadist movements as Al-Qaeda under the intellectual leadership of Abdullah ‘Ezam and the practical leadership of Bin Laden and after him Ayman al-Zawahiri can be considered the second generation of Takfirist Salafist movements. This new generation despite its actions like 9/11 still retained its proximity with other Muslim sects and had fighting with US and Israel as its priority; but the major development occurred after the emergence of a man called Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi. After US invasion of Afghanistan and after that of Iraq, Zarqawi’s group *Jimah Bayat al-Imam fi al-Ordun* (1966) changed its name first to *Jamah al-Tawhid va al-Jihad* (2001) and then to *Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn* (2004) and in the same year it announced its allegiance to Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. Zarqawi in 2006 voiced his decision of the formation of Islamic State in Iraq to revive the caliphate; this is the same state that was led after his death by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and after him by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir one of his high ranked deputies until 2010 and after their death in 2013 this movement has undergone a boring suspension. After the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq in 2012 that was considered an insignificant political action, Islamic State found an appropriate atmosphere for reemergence and the implementation of new plans drawn by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi six years earlier. The rise of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2013 was owing to previous crises and developments (Bunzel, 2015: 5). The ideology of ISIS should be understood in two stages: knowing this group’s Salafist Jihadism that is the focal point of its political thought and its violent and radical action against infidels and particularly Shias and these distinguish it from Al-Qaeda and this is the main reason of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s refusal of its endorsement. The intellectual forefather of contemporary Islamic State is Zarqawi, the man from whom ISIS has drawn its radical and violent model of Jihadi Salafism. Zarqawi was first trained by his mentor Abu Muhammad al-Muqaddasi (who does also have radical stances on Shia), but later even Al-Muqaddasi condemned him due to his radical anti-Shia approach. Anti-Shiism and the revival of caliphate, based on the teachings of Ibn Taymiyyah and Muhammad Ibn Abdel Wahhab, are two basic pillars of his radical theories and ideas; in other words, the same ideas whose manifestation can be seen in the current actions of ISIS. Speeches and texts of Islamic State insist on some ideological notions among most important ones of which one can refer to the following: 1- all Muslims are obliged to join true Muslims (who have gathered under the banner of Islamic State) and help them and fight the infidels; 2- negligence in implementation of Sharia of Allah is tantamount to apostasy; 3- fighting Islamic State is an act of infidelity; 4- Shia Muslims are infidels who deserve to die; 5- Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas are traitors and enemies of Islam (Ibid: 9-10). Zarqawi and after him Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi were hugely influenced by two contemporary radical Salafist jurists, i.e. 1- Abu Bakr Naji the author of *Edarat al-Tawahush*, 2- Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir al-Misri the author of *Masaal min Fiqh al-Jihad (Fiqh al-Dima)*. The first book is a strategic manifesto while the other is the jurisprudential manifesto of ISIS. These two works promote radicalism and political violence using an anarchistic and nihilistic approach that can be only compared with *Catechism of a Revolutionary* by Sergey Nechayev and 19th century Russian anarchism. Parts of the major themes of *Edarat al-Tawahush* are as follows: flexibility and stagnation are two elements involved in the failure of every Jihadi action, those who act moderately are recommended to stay home, occurrence of any weakness and laziness will result in disintegration and power exhaustion, for convincing the youth to join us for war we need to spur hatred in them and get people involved in the war. We have to manage this war in a very radical and violent fashion; in a way that fear increases the heart-beats (Naji, 2004: 31-33). This work can be considered a modern version of Ibn Taymiyyah’s *Al-Syasat al-Shar’iyyah* that provides the political strategies needed for the management of society. The main themes of *Fiqh al-Jihad* (that is of jurisprudential and religious bent) that deals with twenty problems can be outlined as follows: 1- Dar al-Islam va Dar al-Kufr: Abu Abdullah al-Misri offers the dichotomy of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufr based on Quranic verses and prophetic traditions and describes every land in which Islamic law is not observed as Dar al-Kufr (Land of Infidelity) (Al-Muhajir, nd., 18). 2- Rulers who do not observe the Divine Codes are infidels. 3- Islam is not just a verbal citation of Islamic Articles of Faith including daily prayer, paying alms and fasting and mere infidelity is an evidence for death penalty. 4- Support of infidels (including Christians, Jews and Shia) is tantamount to apostasy. 5- Shia Muslims and Khawarij are deviated and infidels: he believes that it is not allowed to use Shias in the battle against infidels rather they are all deceptive and diabolic and should be excommunicated (ibid: 358-360). In other chapters of his own book he turns to the legitimacy of terror, suicide bombing, kidnapping, burning and drowning the infidels, making no discrimination regarding military and civilians in war, legitimacy of killing of captives and the like. What should be noted in this context is the unavoidable synthesis of social crises in mass societies and theological and jurisprudential teachings of Salafist and Wahhabi radical jurists through a circular and dialectical process; in every stage of the dialectical process the concrete form of multidimensional and miscellaneous social crises influences the totality of process in the form of the dominated social structures (mutually connected coherent union of social crises and movements). To put it otherwise, the overall framework of the process of theoretical and practical evolution of Takfirist and Salafist movements is a part of its particular content that can be just analyzed in its sociological formulation (political sociology). The aforementioned groups and movements from Zarqawi to Baghdadi can be declared the third generation of Takfirist Salafist streams (or neo-Salafism), the generation whose logic is justification as means for the achievement of the goal and does not care about resorting to any form of violent crime.

Salafist Social Movements: Product of Social Crises or Islamic Teachings?

Previous sections sought to explain the intellectual and social foundations of TakfiristSalafist movements in a concise manner as well as their interrelation. The significant question that can be raised here is: What is the essential relationship between Islamic teachings and contemporary radical takfiristSalafist movements in the Middle East? Are these radical doctrines (that are incessantly produced by Salafist radical jurists) rooted in the very nature of Islam or are they mere products of special interpretations (like those presented by TakfiristSalafist groups) in the context of social crises? The truth is that the notion of pure unconditional Islamic Textualismdoes not have any place in sociological debates, rather we have to consider the society a “concrete totality” in which everything is synthetic and dialectic. Religious texts and Quranic verses that refer to Jihad, regardless of numerous commentaries that have been offered of them, have continuously existed in the course of history. Why have the same doctrines been the source of peace and peaceful coexistence in certain eras of human history without being the fountainhead of radicalism (as manifested in the contemporary Salafist movements)? The core intention of the current essay is contextualization of doctrines within a sociological framework and in view of social, political and geopolitical backgrounds avoiding essentialistic and orientalist approach to religion. Since religions, particularly Islam before Christianity, have been the victims of this view it is so surprising that today essentialistic notion of Islam in a nominalist form is so prevalent. It is this very view that reduces Islam as a unique signifier to various Islamic sects from Islamic radicalism, Islamic terrorism, Islamic fascism, Islamic totalitarianism and Islamic fundamentalism. Regardless of social relevance of these doctrines, pondering on them despite its rewards has continuously been an epistemological danger in the path of common sense and the arguments that interpret the notions in vacuum away from their social contexts. In his paper on Islam and Political Violence, John Esposito has dealt with this issue and alluded to the misuses ofTakfiristSalafistmovementsof Quran for legitimization of their actions. In this regard, he writes: “While a great number of believers are reading Islamic texts in their historical contexts, religious fundamentalists and terrorists misuse these texts as an excuse for their actions”(Esposito, 2015: 1068). Philip Jenkins who has conducted an independent study of the number of violent verses in the Quran and the Gospels after 9/11 and published the research results in *Jesus Wars: How Four Patriarchs, Three Queens, and Two Emperors Decided What Christians Would Believe for the Next 1,500 years* announced that he has surprisingly found that violent verses are comparatively fewer in Quran than in the Gospels. He compares the social situation in twentieth century Islamic Middle East with Christianity in fifth century and concludes that all horrible political violence that is perpetuated today under the banner of Islam and through such Takfirist andSalafist movements as Al-Qaeda have had records in Christian world and basically understanding Islamic Middle East can contribute to understanding Christian history and vice versa. (Jenkins, 2010: 56-58). Accordingly, one can conclude that besidesstudying the teachings,we need to explain the “social situation” in which they have emerged in order to analyze the quality of emergence of Salafist social movements. In other words, besides intellectual foundations and textual bases, reflection on the role of social crises in the emergence of contemporary Takfirist and Salafist movements that was referred to before this under a multidimensional comprehensive approach is necessary.

Conclusion. As we mentioned in the introduction and the research questions, the aim of the current research is explanation and analysis of intellectual and social foundations of the emergence of contemporary Salafist movements in a synthetic manner. This explanation and analysis sought to dialectically and circularly reveal the role of historical and social crises in the emergence of ideas that have been propounded in the works of such Salafist thinkers as IbnTaymiyyah, Abu BakrNaji, Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir al-Misrias well as their multidimensional and miscellaneous nature in the context of TakfiristSalafist movements that promote violence and terror in the Middle East. In the course of this research through an intellectual genealogy of Salafist movements the role of Muslim Brotherhood as the root of political Islam in contemporary era was shown through an exposition of the social contexts, crises and responses in the confrontation between the West and the Islamic world and it was argued that contemporary Salafist movements are the result of promotion of crises and thoughts. These social crises and contexts can be traced back to the fall of Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, Mongol invasion, WWI, Sykes-Picot Agreement, Balfour Declaration, fall of Ottoman Empire, and the birth of Muslim Brotherhood, death of Gamal Abdel Naseer, and war in Algeria, USSR, Afghanistan and Iraq. In the current historical era, the world is witness to a bloody horror that has emerged in the form of such movements as ISIS, Jibhat al-Nusra, Boko Haram, Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and aims at domination over the infidel world and changing it to Dar al-Islam. Thus everyday a new wave of violence and conflict surges in Middle East and other corners of the world. An unprecedented invasion and terror with an anarchistic approach that is associated with brutality and barbarism this time in contrast to previous generations reveals its horrific face without any reservation and hurts people’s emotions with utmost cruelty; but, what is the reason for this amount of violence and barbarism? Is thislicentious wave of violence “one-sided” and blindly upsurges in the Western and Islamic countries? What is the reason of the happiness and joy derived by many TakfiristSalafistsfrom bombings and suicide operations in western countries that are an expression of repressed complexes? These are the questions that should be pondered upon and discussed more. Almost 50 years ago Jean Paul Sartre wrote anintroduction to Franz Fanon’s *The Wretched of the Earth* under the title of “A Tribunal for West” after witnessing Algerian war in which more than one million Algerians were massacred; there he offered an interesting analysis of the behavior of western world and France with Algeria that perhaps has been less considered as regards the latest events. In this introduction Sartre speaks of “hatred confrontation” or a “reversed violence” that will surge through this “fat and pale continent”. He also notes that: the memory of brutal policies of western colonialists towards Algerian Muslims and

other Islamic countries can be never eliminated from the minds unless via retaliatory invasion and conflict (Fanon, 1988: 22-25). Which invasion does Sartre mention that needs to be retaliated if we want to neutralize it? What relation and similarity do brutal Salafist movements have with western hidden invasions and violations? Baudrillard considers fundamental violence of terrorism an expression of the denial of all institutions representing the western states that aim the silenced masses (Baudrillard, 2008: 79-81). Žižek regards it a luring temptation that overshadows the subjects (particularly western people) and makes them prioritize their instinctual reactions over the logical and abstract arguments and thus lose their thinking power and take “bare violence” as the main cause and forget “hidden violence” (Žižek, 2015: 12; cf. Michaud, 2002: 57-59). Accordingly, it seems that analysis of the quality of the relationship between western world and Islamic world in the course of history and particularly in the last century or half century can reveal the reason of the emergence of radical terrorist actions in the form of Takfirist Salafist radical movements; of course, we cannot understand the bare and reversed violence that we are witnessed to now merely based on the concept of hidden violence and western policies in relation to Islamic world or pro-violence religious texts and jurisprudential ideas of Salafist thinkers and jurists as well as the social and political crises in individual form, rather the best comprehensive explanation of this phenomenon is more dependent on a multivariate synthetic analysis that includes all these elements; this study sought to near itself to such an analysis that undoubtedly needs further future researches in order to be complete.

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