The relationship of rights and obligations: questions of theory

Abstract

It is indicated that, in the modern period of conflicting legal norms, one of the means of ensuring the implementation and observance of constitutional obligations is the responsibility and sanctions of the norms of the current legislation.

It is noted that in the modern world, with the rapid development of society, the issue of compliance with law and morality is becoming more and more necessary and relevant. That is why considerable attention should be paid to the consideration, analysis and research of these two concepts. Today, law and morality depend on each other. Norms of morality and law are the most widespread and quite important for society. They are intertwined in the process of social regulation, their demands coincide in many respects: what law allows or prohibits, and morality encourages or condemns. The interaction of morality and law in society is a very complex and diverse process. Strongly influencing morality, law contributes to its intensive implementation in the minds of all members of society, at the same time, under the influence of moral requirements, law constantly improves and elevates its role as a social regulator of social relations.

The author emphasizes that the attitude to rights and duties in the context of a person’s legal status creates a rather complex problem for ethics and morality. On the one hand, theorists fix such qualities of moral demands as universality and a high level of commonality. Ethical theory in the sense of attitude to rights and duties inevitably uses as one of its bases the moral ideas of “ordinary man” or “ordinary human mind”. It cannot simply ignore moral intuitions, although it can make attempts to discredit some of them, especially if they contradict the main body of moral convictions and are not accompanied by absolute certainty. However, moral duties to have a different character. They are an integral component of the normative system of universal morality and have an almost axiomatic character for the “ordinary person”.