The principle of humanism in the legal system: general theoretical aspects and criminal-legal implementation

Abstract

The article examines the principle of humanism as a fundamental element of the modern legal system, analyzing both its general theoretical foundations and its practical implementation in the field of criminal law. The study traces the philosophical and historical origins of humanism — from ancient thought to contemporary human rights concepts — and establishes its normative significance as a cross-cutting principle that permeates the entire legal system. The authors demonstrate that humanism functions not merely as an abstract philosophical ideal but as a concrete legal mechanism that guides lawmaking, judicial practice, and law enforcement activity. Particular attention is paid to the systemic nature of legal principles, the classification of which reveals the hierarchical structure of the legal system and the central place of humanism within it. The article analyzes the dialectical opposition between humanism and anti-humanism as a methodological tool for understanding the dynamic development of humanistic principles in law. The study also critically examines the historical experience of declarative consolidation of humanistic principles in Soviet-era legislation, emphasizing the gap between formal proclamation and practical implementation. In the criminal law dimension, the authors explore the concept of humanization of criminal legislation, the development of alternative sanctions, and restorative justice mechanisms in light of international standards. The article concludes that the level of implementation of the principle of humanism in the legal system serves as an indicator of societal maturity, and that genuine humanistic progress requires not only legislative reform but also the moral development of society as a whole.