The impact of the prohibition of the threat or use of force on wartime diplomacy in international law

Abstract

This article examines the impact of the principle prohibiting the threat or use of force on the content, limits, and functions of wartime diplomacy in contemporary international law. The relevance of the topic stems from the fact that, in the context of modern armed conflicts, hybrid forms of confrontation, coercive diplomatic signalling, and expansive interpretations of the right of self-defence, the place of diplomacy in situations involving the threat or actual use of force has become increasingly contested. This issue is especially significant against the background of the Russian Federation’s armed aggression against Ukraine, as well as within broader trends in contemporary international practice, where diplomatic pressure, demonstrations of force, and legal justifications for the use of force are ever more frequently intertwined.

The choice of topic is also conditioned by the fact that wartime diplomacy remains an underexplored phenomenon in international legal doctrine. Despite the substantial body of scholarship devoted to the prohibition of the use of force, the right of self-defence, jus ad bellum, and the mechanisms for maintaining international peace and security, insufficient attention has been paid to the question of how precisely the principle prohibiting the threat or use of force shapes the normative boundaries of wartime diplomacy. The article argues that wartime diplomacy should be regarded not merely as a practical instrument of communication in conditions of armed conflict, but also as a distinct form of diplomatic activity whose lawfulness and functional purpose are determined by the logic of Article 2 and Article 51 of the UN Charter. The study seeks to deepen the doctrinal understanding of wartime diplomacy, clarify its place within the system of international law, and outline promising directions for further research in this field.