Reasonableness of court decisions in the paradigm of psychological, logical and doctrinal analysis

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15587/2523-4153.2024.307745

Keywords:

court decision, reasonableness, psychology, logic, doctrine, judgment, reasoning, validity, justice, criminal procedure, fair trial

Abstract

The article is devoted to the study of the concept of reasoning of court decisions through psychological, logical and doctrinal aspects. Reasonableness of court decisions is a multifaceted concept, which is influenced by the interaction of these three key aspects. Studying the characteristics of a court decision as a special type of legal document through the prism of interdisciplinary dialogue improves understanding of the processes underlying judicial thinking and the formalization of its outcome. Cognitive biases, emotional state and social pressure influence the decision-making process. The article analyzes certain psychological theories and concepts that emphasize the influence of psychological factors on the motivation of judicial decisions. The author emphasizes the importance of logical consistency in legal reasoning. The author examines the common logical techniques, used in rendering court decisions and their reasoning, and also identifies the importance of consistent and rational judgments in law enforcement. In addition, the author examines how established legal doctrines affect the characteristics of a court decision, including its motivation, and how deviations from these doctrines may affect public perception of court decisions. Understanding and taking into account psychological, logical and doctrinal aspects in the process of making a court decision is important for increasing the level of motivation of court decisions, and as a result, ensuring the right to a fair trial and building trust in the legal system in general

Author Biographies

Tetiana Lotysh, The National University of Ostroh Academy

Postgraduate Student

Educational and Scientific Institute of Law by I. Malynovskyi

Olha Balatska, The National University of Ostroh Academy

PhD, Associate Professor, Director

Educational and Scientific Institute of Law by I. Malynovskyi

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Published

2024-07-03

How to Cite

Lotysh, T., & Balatska, O. (2024). Reasonableness of court decisions in the paradigm of psychological, logical and doctrinal analysis. ScienceRise: Juridical Science. https://doi.org/10.15587/2523-4153.2024.307745

Issue

2024: Article in press

Section

Juridical Science

License

Copyright (c) 2024 Tetiana Lotysh, Ольга Романівна Балацька

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