Військова і безпекова складові внутрішньої та зовнішньої політики Російської Федерації у 2007–2014 рр.

Андрій Демартино


The radical actions of the Kremlin, which led to the annexation of the Crimea and the support of the separatists in the East of Ukraine, were conditioned by fundamental changes in Russia’s domestic and foreign policy, which began much earlier and were connected with the historically determined irrational aspirations of Russians to territorial expansion. The turning point of radical changes in Russia’s domestic and foreign policy can be considered the famous speech of Putin, which he spoke at the Munich Security Conference on February 10, 2007, and openly said that he «really thinks about the problems of international security.» The main points of this report are the following: the unacceptability and impossibility for a modern world of a unipolar model of international relations; the need to find a reasonable balance between the interests of all actors in international politics; the inadmissibility of the invasion of the United States of America in all spheres of world development and the imposition of rules of the game to other states; the admissibility of the use of military force as the last argument only on the basis of the UN Charter; termination of the provocative NATO expansion to the East as reducing the level of mutual trust in the world; the hopelessness of the West’s economic policy towards the Third World countries; stopping the process of transforming the OSCE into a tool for securing the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries relative to other countries; the formation of a just, democratic world order capable of ensuring prosperity not only for the elected but for all.

Putin’s speech served as an occasion for controversy in the Western political circles to restore the «cold» war. By the Russian side, the Munich speech of Putin was seen as a further program of foreign policy of Russia in the late 2000’s - early 2010’s. External causes of radical change in the course of the Russian Federation: 1) the enlargement of NATO and the EU to the east in 2004, which took place without taking into account the interests of the Russian Federation, and this is against the backdrop of the intensified declaration of Putin after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 supporting the American strategy to combat terrorism; 2) «color revolutions» that took place in 2003-2005 in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, and were actively supported by the United States and the leading European countries. The conservative part of the Russian elite perceived them as an offensive against Russia’s interests in the post-Soviet space. Internal reasons: 1) the rise in oil prices on the world market since the early 2000’s, accompanied by a surge of foreign direct investment and a cessation of capital outflow. In conjunction with the dependence of European countries on the supply of Russian energy resources, all this generated in the higher political elite a sense of Russia’s new status as an «energy superpower» and claims to restore its role in world politics; 2) the defeat of the big business (Berezovsky, Khodorkovsky) in the struggle for power in the Russian Federation and the growing influence of the federal bureaucracy and security forces, which led by Putin to gain mass support in the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2003-2004.

After Munich in Russia, a whole series of conceptual, legislative, structural changes and organizational measures aimed at adapting state institutions and politics under new conditions was launched. The preparation and conduct of the presidential elections in Russia, which resulted in the «return» of Putin to a senior position in the state, finally severed the Kremlin, even with the possibility of establishing a pragmatic cooperation with the West, which attempts were made during the reign of D. Medvedev within the framework of the «reboot» from the United States and «Partnership for Modernization» programs with Germany and the EU.

Thus, the evolution of the domestic and foreign policy of the Russian Federation in 2007-2014 is largely due to the imperial essence of the state and society of this country, due to all its historical historical development. In addition, the subjective factor associated with the activities of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin and his oligarchic leadership headed by his desire for personal enrichment and indivisible domination in the post-Soviet geopolitical space, played a role in changing the country’s political course. Accordingly, Russian aggression against Ukraine, which began in February 2014, should be considered a natural result of the expansionist aspirations of the ruling class in Russia.

Ключові слова

internal politics; foreign policy; geopolitical space; political radicalism; Munich speech V. Putin; military reform; strategic decisions; international relations

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