THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.63978/3083-6476.2025.2.2.10Keywords:
military doctrine, Russian Federation, hybrid warfare, UkraineAbstract
The article is dedicated to analyzing the historical evolution and transformation of russian military doctrine from the early 20th century to the present day. It examines key periods and military conflicts-such as the Polish-Soviet War, the Winter War, the war in Afghanistan, the Chechen and Georgian wars-highlighting their impact on the development of Russian military thought. Special attention is paid to post-Soviet military doctrines and the influence of the so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine” on contemporary Russian military strategy. The article identifies common features of Russian military operations, including the justification of aggression, readiness to sustain heavy human losses, and a tendency to commit war crimes. The goal of the study is to identify the key stages and factors that have shaped Russian military thinking, as well as to outline the main trends and characteristics of Russia's current military doctrine within the context of its ongoing aggression against Ukraine. The analysis demonstrates that during the initial phase of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Federation implemented its 2014 military doctrine and General Gerasimov’s concept, which emphasized non-military means and rapid, decisive action. However, failures during the first year of the war-due to a variety of factors-forced Russia to adjust its tactics and methods of combat employment. Since 2024, modern drone technologies and electronic warfare have become a central element of combat operations for both sides, providing advantages in intelligence gathering, precision strikes, and countermeasures. As a result, the Russo-Ukrainian War has fundamentally transformed the nature of modern warfare, making the prospect of victory directly dependent on the development and integration of new technologies.
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