ANALYSIS OF THE DISPROPORTION BETWEEN THE DYNAMICS OF HYBRID (SUB-THRESHOLD) THREATS AND THE CURRENT MODEL OF MANAGEMENT OF UKRAINE’S SECURITY AND DEFENSE SECTOR
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.63978/3083-6476.2026.1.4.06Keywords:
hybrid threats, sub-threshold aggression, security and defence sector, Joint Analytical Centre for Hybrid Threats, horizontal coordination, public-private partnership, active defence, NATO, critical infrastructure resilienceAbstract
The article examines the systemic disproportion between the accelerated evolution of hybrid (subthreshold) threats and the conservative vertical-hierarchical model of governance of Ukraine’s security and defence sector (SDS). Drawing on CSIS data (2025), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025, RAND “From Policy to Victory” (2025), NATO StratCom COE “The Collage of the Kremlin’s Communication Strategy” (2025), and WEF Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2025, the authors demonstrate that traditional inter-agency “silos” have become the primary vulnerability of the state. The aggressor operates non-linearly and networked, exploiting the “seams” between the RNBO, MoD, SBU, State Special Communications Service, and private critical infrastructure operators (over 80 % of objects).
The existing normative framework (Law on National Security 2018, Cybersecurity Strategy 2021, CMU Order No. 853-r 2025) lacks effective mechanisms for horizontal coordination and real-time data exchange. This results in a chronic institutional lag, whereby intelligence information fails to translate into preventive action.
The central proposal is the establishment of a Joint Analytical Centre for Hybrid Threats (JACHT) – a compact hub (55–65 specialists) directly subordinated to the RNBO. The Centre integrates three functional blocks: AI-driven predictive monitoring, legal-attribution assessment, and a public-private interface based on Data Sharing Agreements. Implementation requires targeted amendments to Article 12 of the Law on National Security and updates to the Cybersecurity Strategy incorporating Active Defence elements.
The practical value of the study lies in substantiating the transition from a reactive to a predictive SDS governance model and providing concrete recommendations for the pilot launch of JACHT in 2027.
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