I.V. Zhabianok. Establishing a nash equilibrium market dominated illegally distribute information.

Authors

  • І В Жабенок

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31498/2225-6725.22.2011.21389

Keywords:

market, information, mechanism of equilibrium, antiblaga

Abstract

The work deals with the peculiarities of functioning of the information-benefits market. It is illustrated that the existence of the possibility of illegal distribution of information is a particular case of “tragedy of commons”. In other words, such a situation is Nash-equilibrium which doesn’t comply with Pareto-effective condition.

References

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  3. Akrerlof J. The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics (The MIT Press) 84 (3): 488–500
  4. Becker G. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. The Journal of Political Economy 76. – 1968. – pp. 169–217
  5. Gilotte Laurent, Laraa Michel De. A tight sufficient condition for Radner–Stiglitz nonconcavity in the value of information. Journal of Economic Theory. Volume 137, Issue 1, November 2007, P. 696-708
  6. Hal R. Varian. Economics of Information Technology. July 2001
  7. Chade Hector and Schlee Edward. Another Look at the Radner–Stiglitz Nonconcavity in the Value of Information. Journal of Economic Theory. Volume 107, Issue 2, December 2002, P. 421-452
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  12. Stigler, George J., 1961. “The Economics of Information,” Journal of Political Economy, 69(3), pp. 213- 225
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  18. Knight, FH Risk, Uncertainty and Profit / FH Knight: Trans. from English. J. M. Kazhdan, scientific. Ed. V. Grebennikov. - Moscow: The Case,2003 – 359 р.
  19. Akrerlof J. The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics (The MIT Press) 84 (3): 488–500
  20. Becker G. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. The Journal of Political Economy 76. – 1968. – pp. 169–217
  21. Gilotte Laurent, Laraa Michel De. A tight sufficient condition for Radner–Stiglitz nonconcavity in the value of information. Journal of Economic Theory. Volume 137, Issue 1, November 2007, P. 696-708
  22. Hal R. Varian. Economics of Information Technology. July 2001
  23. Chade Hector and Schlee Edward. Another Look at the Radner–Stiglitz Nonconcavity in the Value of Information. Journal of Economic Theory. Volume 107, Issue 2, December 2002, P. 421-452
  24. Ostrom Elinor, Cox James, Walker James. Trust in Private and Common Property Experiments”. Southern Economic Journal 75(4) (April 2009): 957–75.
  25. Piracy Study 08. Sixth annual BSA-IDC global software. May 2009
  26. Simon, H.A. The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd ed. MIT Press 1996
  27. Stigler G. The economics of information. Journal of Political Economy, 69(3): 213 – 225
  28. Stigler, George J., 1961. “The Economics of Information,” Journal of Political Economy, 69(3), pp. 213- 225
  29. Varian, Hal R. Markets for Information Goods. Berkeley. – University of California, April 1998
  30. Warming Jens. On Open Access, Pigovian Tax, and Property Rights (1931)
  31. World Economic Outlook Database-April 2010, International Monetary Fund. Accessed on April 21, 2010.
  32. Zhu, X., Lee, Y., Simon, H.A., & Zhu, D. (1996). Cue recognition and cue elaboration in learning from examples. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 93, 1346-1351

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How to Cite

Жабенок, І. В. (2017). I.V. Zhabianok. Establishing a nash equilibrium market dominated illegally distribute information. REPORTER OF THE PRIAZOVSKYI STATE TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY Section: Economic Sciences, (22), 30–36. https://doi.org/10.31498/2225-6725.22.2011.21389

Issue

No. 22 (2011): Вісник Приазовського державного технічного університету. Серія: Економічні науки

Section

Статті

License

Copyright (c) 2019 І В Жабенок

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