Determining the effect of a floating point on the Falcon digital signature algorithm security
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15587/1729-4061.2024.295160Keywords:
quantum-resistant transformations, lattice-based cryptography, attack on implementation, NIST PQC, NTRUAbstract
The object of research is digital signatures. The Falcon digital signature scheme is one of the finalists in the NIST post-quantum cryptography competition. Its distinctive feature is the use of floating-point arithmetic. However, floating-point arithmetic has so-called rounding noise, which accumulates during computations and in some cases may lead to significant changes in the processed values. The work considers the problem of using rounding noise to build attacks on implementation. The main result of the study is a novel attack on implementation, which enables the secret key recovery. This attack differs from existing attacks in using two separately secure implementations with different computation orders. As a result of the analysis, the conditions under which secret key recovery is possible were revealed. The attack requires 300,000 signatures and two implementations to recover key. The probability of successful attack ranges from 70 % to 76 %. This probability is explained by the structure of the Gaussian sampling algorithm used in the Falcon digital signature. At the same time, a necessary condition for conducting an attack is identical seed during signature generation. This condition makes the attack more theoretical than practical since the correct implementation of the Falcon makes probability of two identical seeds negligible. However, the possible usage of floating-point noise shows potential existence of additional attack vectors for the Falcon that should be covered in security models. The results could be used in the construction of digital signature security models and their implementation in existing information and communication systems
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Copyright (c) 2024 Oleksandr Potii, Olena Kachko, Serhii Kandii, Yevhenii Kaptol
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